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This study evaluates the limits of Schutz's interpretative'
sociology. While taking the problems of meaning and
intersubjectivity as the key to understanding social action,
Schutz conceives it as a `scientific' (or rather, a 'scientistic')
enterprise not entirely -Freed from certain objectivistic bias.
His methodology is the result of such an endeavour which, on the
one hand ackncjledge the importance of subjective meaning, and on
the other hand seeks to ground sociological interpretation on a
rather 'objectivistic' (i.%ihe Cher phenomenological or positivistic)
notion of `objectivity'.
Assessment will be offered on Schutz's methodology and
solution' to the problems of inter subjectivity and meaning
against the background of contemporary social theory On
examination doubts are raised about the logical coherence of such
a methodology and the 1ity of its execution. It will be
suggested that only a hermeneutically informed critical sociology
can free an' interpretative sociofog', Schutz i an. or otherwise,
from its objectivistic underF innings.
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THE BREAKDOWN OF THE ORTHODOX CONSENSUS 
AND THE NEED FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL THEORY
1.1 INTRODUCTION
At the minimum this study a11 ernp t s io assess Schu tz ■' s 
solutions to the problems of i n ter su b.j e c t i v i t y an d me an i n q , 
Beyond that it also wishes to r e I a t e Sc hu t z s  con tr i bu t i on s t o 
some o-f the central issues in social theory. Any past theorist's 
work can be assessed either in terms of its logical consistency or 
in terms of its relevance in con temporary sociological theorising; 
the present study attempts to encompass both tasks, hence its sub­
title: a critique and re-appropriation.
The "'orthodox consensus-' * , as Giddens uses the term, refers 
to the prevalence of both func ti ona 1 ism and posi 11vism i n the
1. This term was first employed by Dick Athinson in his 1971
book. Apparently G i ddens adopted this t erm w i thou t
acknowledging its source, 6 idoens's usage of this term, 
however, differs f r om A tk i nson ' s , f or whom t he f erm r ef er s to 
a theoretical convergence among social theorists which 
culminates in a neglect ion of voluntarism in the
understanding of living actors.
Chapter I i
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prop a5 the doctrine of the natural identity of interest?"^
Parsoi’is' s 'solution' to th i s Hobbes i an prob 1 ern of order i s 
notorious for its internal contradictions. On the one hand, he 
posits his so-called 'voluntaristic theory of action' as the key 
to the transcendence of the 'positivistic-idealistic dualism', 
I'Jh e r e a s ' p os i t i v i srn' ^  disc ar ds all subjective me an i n gs of ac t i on 
as irrelevant to their explanation, 'idealism' goes to the extreme 
in stressing m a n ’s subjective orientation to value to the extent 
of neglecting the restraints of objective situations, Both are 
therefore seriously handicapped in offering an adequate 
explanation of social action. According to Parsons, action "must 
a 1ways be thought of as i nvo1v i ng a state of tensi on be tween two 
different orders of elements, the normative and the conditional, 
As process, action is ... the process of alteration of the 
condi t i onal e1emen ts i n the di rec t i on of conformi ty wi th norms. 
Elimination of the normative aspect of action altogether 
eliminates the concept of action itself and leads to the radical 
positivistic position. Elimination of conditions ... equally 
el i m i n ates ac t i on an d results in idealistic emanat i on ism, Th us
conditions may be conceived at one pole, ends and normative rules 
at the other, means and effort as the connecting links between 
them."7
On the other hand, however, Parsons can only incorporate 
'voluntarism' into his theory of society and hence of social order 
by positing 'va 1ue' as the invisible link be tween the need-
o
dispositions of personal i ty and social stability . The reason for­
th is fatal contradiction is that Parsons is still too much tied to 
the utilitarian conception of the relationship between individual 
and soc i e t y . Within this tradition the individual is con c e ive d of
5. Parsons, 1937, p.102.
6. As employed by Parsons, the term 'positivism' has a rather
peculiar and narrower meaning than here.
7. Parsons, 1937, p.732.
8. See D. Lockwood, 1964; Giddens, 1976; Atkinson, 1971; and
Dawe, 1978 etc.
Chapter I
The problem o-f order as generally posed and discussed in most
sociological discourses takes -for granted that modern society is
one 'n which the vsocial' has gained a measure o-f independence
from i he Apolitical'. As a result order is o-f ten conceptualised
as to be guaranteed not so much xfr0m above by a state (e.g.,
Hobbes and Hege 1) as 1 -frorn be 1 ow' by shared normat i ve el ernents.
For Hobbes, the nature o-f the units to be ordered are
individuals. Given Hobbes's twin assumptions about man's lust for
power and wealth, and that no one of the units to be ordered is
much stronger than any other, it is not surprising that Hobbes
concludes that there is an inherent tendency for social
intercourse to degenerate into a perpetual war of all against all.
But we all Know that this is far from being the case in any
enduring society. Why is there not a constant war of all against
all if each individual pursues his own self-interest by whatever-
means that are at his disposal? Why is life not, as a consequence
of this continua1 conflict, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and
short? How, in a word, is a degree of integration in society
ever achieved?
In the course of the development of social and political
theory innumerab1e attempts to answer this basic question have
been proffered. Social order has been explained alternatively in
terms of fear, coercion, interest, inertia, or internalization of
social norms etc
One of the purposes of Parsons's path-breaking Xha Biruoinr
o£ Sooial Aclion (1937) is to transcend earlier solutions which
were obviously inadequate. For Parsons, if t h e u ti 1 it a r i an
version o-f the theory of action cannot account for the element of
order in social relationships necessary to make this possible,
then the central problem is: How is it possible, still making use
of the general action scheme, to solve the Hobbesian problem of
order and yet not make use of such an objectionable metaphysical
4. P. Cohen, 1968.
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prop as the doctrine of the natural identity of interest?"^
F arsons - s ''solution'' to this Hobbes i an problem of order is 
notorious for its internal contradictions. On the one hand, he 
pos i ts h i s so-cal 1 ed \.>ol un tar i st i c theory of ac t i on / as the key  
to the transcendence of the '‘positivistic-idealistic dual ism" , 
l-J here a s ' p o s i t i v i sm5 67 8^  d i s c a r d s all subject i v e m e a n i n g s o f a c t i o n 
as irrele can t to the i r e x p 1 an a t i on , 'idealism7 goe s to the e x t r erne 
i n str ess i ng man 7 s subject i v e or i en tat ion to va 1ue to the ex ten t 
of neglecting the restraints of objective situations, Both are 
therefore seriously handicapped in offering an adequate
explanation of social action. According to Parsons, action "must 
a 1ways be thought of as i n volv i ng a state of tension be tweeri two 
d i f f er e n t or der s of el ernen t s , the norma five and the condi ti on a 1 .
As process, action is ... the process of alteration of the
condi t i ona1 eIemen ts i n the di rec ti on of conform i fy wi th norms. 
Elimination of the normative aspect of action altogether
eliminates the concept of action itself and leads to the radical 
pos it i v i st ic pos i t i o n . E 1 im i nat i on of condi t ions ... equa 11y
el i m i n at e s ac t i on an d r esuits in idealistic emanat i on ism, Th u s
conditions may be conceived at one pole, ends and normative rules 
at the other, means and effort as the connecting links between 
them,"^
On the other hand, however, Parsons can only incorporate 
'voluntarism7 into his theory of society and hence of social or der­
by pos i ting 'va 1ue7 as the invisible 1 i nk be tween the need-
o
dispositions of personal i ty and social stability . The reason for­
th i s fatal c on t r a d i c t ion is that Parsons is still t oo much t i e d t o 
the utilitarian conception of the relationship between individual 
and soc i e t y . Wi t h i n this tradition the individual is e on c e iv e d of
5. Parsons, 1937, p.102.
6. As employed by Parsons, the term 'positivism7 has a rather 
peculiar and narrower meaning than here,
7. Parsons, 1937, p.732.
8. See D. Lockwood, 1964; Giddens ,  1976; Atkinson, 1971; and 
Dawe, 1978 etc.
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as an instrumental1y calculative being, whereas society is seen as
something sacred. Now if the Nunit-act' is posited as the
foundation of social order, and if human actors are independent or
voluntary, then we are back to the problem faced by Hobbes. So a
common value system must come first, and social actors must be
socialised into the common value system before they can act, or
even think. Social norms are 'introjected' to form a
constitutive element of the individual personality i tse1f. Thus
introjection is the mechanism through which socia 1 norms beeome
not merely regulative but constitutive of the personality of the
actors. External constraints becomes all the more 'natural' and
effective by losing the appearance of externality and by its
penetration into the very core of human consciousness and sub™
consciousness. Sociology itself is now defined as 0 the science
whic h a 11e m pts to de v e1 op an analytical t h e or y of social ae tion
systems in so far as these systems can be understood in terms of
the property of comrnon-value integration. The net resuIt is the
disappearance of the concept of action itself, and the 'over-
socialised actor' becomes nothing more than a vcultural dope'.
The trouble of Parsons's formulation of the issue is not
solely that the problem of order, as Parsons defined it, was not
Du r k h e i m' s p r ob 1 em, but t h a t Parson s de h uman i se s the
Durkheimian problem by reducing it to a question of the analytic
status of the polity and economy rather than taking the problem in
the broad sense of the meaning of life in a modern industrial
socie ty.'' In other words, the prob1 em of order carmot be
conceptually separated -from the problems of anomie and alienation.
J. Alexanders ambitious UbBOCsiisal Logiii: In Snnlnlngy
(1982) represents, after Parsons (1937) and P. Cohen (3968), the
most recent and powerful restatement of the centrality of the








J. O'Nei11, 1972, p.196.
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argues that " ( a) c t i on and order represent the true presuppos i t i ons 
o+ sociological debate". Following Parsons, he sees action as 
n ece ssar y influenced by both n orrna t i v e fact or s an d t h e c on d \ 11 on a 1 
environment of action. Because sociology has to deal with a 
plural ity of actors the problem of action must be complemented by 
the problem of order, which, according to Alexander, “ is the 
pr ob 1 em of how individual units, of wha t e ve r mo t i va t i on . ar e 
arranged i n non-random soc i al pat terns ,1 * ^  Th i s b<?f i n i t i on i s 
deliberately phrased in such a generic manner that "< e)v e r y theavy
must adopt a solution to the order problem just as it must also
address the problem of action and motivation." The bulk of
Alexander's book is a polemic c om plaint a g ains t v a r i o us r e d ucti o ns
of these two gener i c probl ems to ernp i r i cal , i deo ! og i cal , and
presuppos i t i onal 1 eve 1 s . However , desp i te Si i s almost obsess i ve 
concern for v' gener a 1 i sed theoretical a r- gume r t s ' , h e f ails t o 
d e m o n strata the i r useful n ess. H e c i t e s M . Pol a n y i a n d H . D o u q 1 a s 
to support his claim for the importance of the notion of order
(defined in the broadest sense as contrasted to randomness) in all
scientific investigations. True, thus de f i n e d , n c« on c c ou 1 d
possibly deny that the task of sociological theorising, and 
indeed, all cognitive activities, is to account for 'order', to 
give f orm and mean i ng to a wobbl i ng env i r onment and thus providi ng
us with an axis from which we can orient ourselves to the
su r r ou n d i n g wor Id. But all this is a little mor e t n a u a t r u i srr>,
and the analytical meaning of the term ''order' is thereby lost.
An y soc i a 1 the or y wh i c h articulates the n o t i on of or de r mu st 
define its properties and at the same time locate its structural 
and historical origin. The problem of order, contrary to both 
Parsons's and Alexander's conception of it, is not an abstract 
problem; it is a concrete historical problem. The cry for a 





Alexander is certainly correct in e c h o i n g G i dde n s 1and A1 an
1 7
Dawe that every soc i a 1 the or y, wh e t h e r it s s tarts f r orn t h e
action side or the structure side of the duality, mus t have
implications on the other side as well. The point is therefore
not that there is or can be a sociology of action in contra¬
distinction to a sociology of system, but rather how a particu1ar
social theory articulates and expresses this fundamental duality.
And the trouble of normative functional ism is not that it
concentrates on one side of the duality at the expense of the
other, but that its treatment of the re1 ationship between the two
is dissatisfactory.
We are not here interested in a detailed critique of the
normative functionalist solution' of the problem of order, which
in any case is well documented in the literature. I would rather
like to point out that latent in Sch u t z' s wor k is an a 1t er nativ e
which attributes habitual activities and practical consciousness
rather than an internalization of values as the foundation of
social order. This way of looking at order is potentially more
radical than that of seeing order as the result of legitimation of
dominant or ruling-' ideologies, as some vulgar'' Marxists would
have it. For the latter is in substance at least if not in
principle as well not much different from the functionalist thesis
which posits an intrinsic harmony be tween motivation and value
standards. On the other hand, re-identifying the problem of order-
as pertaining to the production and reproduction of meanings in
e v e ryday life calls for a clearer and mor e c omprehe n siv e
elucidation of the nature of social action and of the everyday,
taken-for-granted ways in which we know and dea 1 with one another
if we are to transcend our predicament. It is precisely in this
direction that Schutz's constitutive phenomenology can help us to
recall the subjective constituting processes of our daily,
habitual action and thus de-reify our otherwise unreflected
experiences.
16. Giddens, 1976 and 1979.
17. Dawe, in Bottomore andNisbet, eds. 1978.
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Underlying this re-appropriation of Sc h u t z ' s work is the 
conviction and commitment that such theorising can lead to a 
greater understanding of the nature of human action and thence 
contributes toward an enhancement of our freedom and
responsibility} and that no authentic social change can s i m p1y be 
registered or 'engineered' from above, for a change of human 
attitudes is necessarily co-con s t i t u t iv e of e v e ry au t h e n t i c soc i a 1 
change. The point is whether such a change in attitudes is a 
'blind' one or one subjected to our reason. As Dawe succintly
puts it, " <t)heorising about social action is man ... reflecting 
on the world in order to 'make and master' himself; articulating 
the history he has made in order to make more."*® Obviously, we 
can only be 'masters' of ourselves if we understand ourselves, the 
conditions, constraints, sources, nature and consequences of our 
actions, as well as their rel at i onsh i ps to others. It is only 
with this vision in mind that we can fu11y appreciate the
significance and meaning of the •works by Marx j Dus• i< h e i m , Freud,
Weber, Goffman, Habermas a n d many o t he r s , past and presen t,
sociologists or non-soci o o u~ s ts, as contri bu t ii  ons t ow a r d a
greater understanding of our common, human condition, and i ts
(possible) transcendence. And u It i rna t e 1 y , it i s w i t h his
contr i bu t ions toward such an objective that Schutz's work ought to 
be assessed.
1.3 CHALLENGES TO POSITIVISM AND THE DEBATES ON METHODOLOGY
As is well known, the term 'positivism' was coined by Comte 
who basically saw it as a philosophy of history, Positive 
knowledge was the inevitable outcome of the progressive 
de ve1opmen t of human know1edge. A f ter Ccmt e , such unan imi ty on 
the meaning of positivism no longer prevails, Pos iti v ism, in the 
current usages of the term, is not a fixed doctrine but is itself 
ever-changing and had taken different forms in various historical 
and intellectual contexts. P. Halfpenny (1982) has identified no 
less than twelve uses of the term in sociological discussions 
alone. Even the so-called '1ogicai-positivists' associa ted with 
the Vienna School did not exhibit any sign of embodying a single
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coherent and s t at ic doc tri n e . Posi t i v i sm , as a phi!osophy of 
science* is subj ec t e d bo th to c on t i n u a 1 in t er n a 1 de ve1opmen t and 
ex terna 1 cha 1 1 enqes wh i ch -foster, change and di fferent i at i on . 
Signif icantly, within much sociological discussions the term is 
usually loaded wi th a p ej or a t i v e an d derogatory connotation, Th e 
r e su 1 t of t b i s d i v e r s i t y of me an i n g an d the de p r ec i at i ve el erne n t 
assoc i a t e ci w i th i i s u sage is th a t mos f part i c i pants in the debates 
simply reject be i ng so 1abelied. In u i ew of this, 1 shall use the 
t e rm Vp os i t i v i s m a s  re f err i ng broadl y to a s t an ce in the 
p h i1osop hy of the social sciences e ndor s i ng the foilow i ng maj or 
tenets:
(1) A subject/object dichotomy. This is the belief that the 
object of knowledge is independent of the knewer, or the 
knowing subject. It is based on a causal theory of 
perception which holds that what the subject penceiyes 
is ultimately determined by the objects of perception.
Two fundamen ta1 assump t i ons under1 i e this causa! theory 
of perception, namely, that objects are taken to be 
independent of our perceiving them in that they continue 
to exist even when they are not being attended to, and 
that objects are taken to be public, i .e . , they can be 
perce i ued in essent i al1y t he s am e ways b y any n umb e r o f 
observers,
< 2) The theore t i ca 1 / obser y at i ona 1 d i chot omy. Th i s i nyol ves 
the idea that a radical break exists between empirical 
obse r y a t ions and n on -emp i r i cal statements; and, be c au se 
of this break, 'phi1osophicalx issues have no 
fundamental significance for the practice of an 
empirically oriented discipline. In other words, the 
truth or falsity of ohsery&tiona! statements is not 
dependent upon the truth or falsity of theories. On the 
contrary, theoretical disputes can readily be resolved 
by reference to agreed observational statements. In
18. A . Dawe, in Bo11omore and Nisbet eds., 1978, p .409.
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short, it is empirica 1 evidence that sover-determines
the status of a theory.
(1)
1he nature of scientific investigation and exp1 anation.
Scientific investigation is considered as aiminq toward
the discovery of law-like generalizations that can
fun c tion as premise s i n de duc tiv e e xp1 an a tion s an d
predictions, Scientific theories are seen as consisting
of se ts of highly general univer sa1 s t a t emen t s about
regular, conis ngen t r e 1 ationship between two or more
p h e n om e n a,, w hose truth o r falsi t y c a n b e a s s e s s e d b y
means of systematic observation and experiment.
4 T h e b e 1 i e f i n t h e v o b j e c t i v i t y' o f s c i e n t i f i c k n ow 1 e d q e,
The question about the possibi1ity of objec tivity in the
philosophy of science in general and in the social
sciences in partic u1ar has genera t e d much he at e d
controver sy. But t here is no one se n se of objec tivity
to which al l scientists and phi1osophers won 1d agree«
In the course of the debate, the term has been employed
to denote at least three different things:
(a) Objectivity as a predicate of ideas. This is the
assumption that there exists a certain correspondence
between our ideas, menta1 imageries or picturizations
and those things of which they are represented.
Under1ying this Nsnapshot' theory of objectivity is a
corresponding theory of truth and a causal theory of
perception to which we have already described,
b) Objactivity as the psycho1ogica1 disposition of the
investioator. This sense of objectivity embodies the
idea that an ideal scientist must be morally and
emo tion ally detac h ed from the object of his study,
(c) Objectivity as a predicate of methods. Here the
application of the term is not to the qualities of the
xfacts' out there or to the attitude of the individual
scientist. Instead, the term applies to a method, or
more precisely, a body of methods, and a tradition of
conducting scientific inquires. As Popper says,
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"scientific ohje c t i vi t y is based so1e1y upon a c r it ic a] 
tradition ,.. the object i v i ty of science is n o f a ma11 e r 
of the individual scientists but rather the social 
result of their mutual criticism"^, The first two 
conceptions of objectivity can n ow be re gar ded as be i ng 
obsolete and an ac hr on i st i c . It is the third c oneept i on 
of objec t i vi ty that is at present most r igorou s1y 
contested and defended by the participants of the 
debate.
The above sketches are not meant to fae exhaust ive of the 
alleged features of the so-called "posi t i v i st I c persuasion'^ , nor 
am I suggest i ng that all 1 pos i t i v i sts' endor- se them w i thou t 
significant modifications. Rather, these are some of their 
distinctive character i st i cs that are being challenged by 
successive 'waves of revolt' since the development of the social 
sciences along the lines of the natural sciences. These include 
t h e ph e n orne n o 1 ogi cal mov emen t inspired by Hu sser 1 ? t h e an a 1 y t i c 
philosophy of ordinary language associated with the later 
l-i i t tgenste i n , Austin, Sear 1 e and W i nch ; the hermeneu t i ca 1 
i mag i nati on deriv i ng f rom the works of He i degger and 1 ater 
elaborated by Gadamer; the "symbol i c interact i on ism' of Me ad an d 
B1umer\ struc turali st and post-structuralist French phi1osophy; 
the critical theory of Marxism espoused by the Frankfurt School 
and Habermas; as well as the current of various "post-positivist/ 
philosophies of science and social science ranging from the works 
of H. Pol anyi, T. Kuhn, S. Toulmin and P . Feyerabend to the 
''real i snr of Quine, Hesse, R. N a m e  and R. Bhaskar .
19. Popper, in Adorno ed«, 1976, p . 9 5 .
20. The term is Alexander's. See Alexander, 1981.
21. It must be emphasized that these different strands of thought 
take issues with the "positivists' at different levels of 
analysis. Habermas and Gadamer, for example, attack them at 
the "metatheoretical' level. Whereas B1umer's critique is 
mainly directed at the level of methodo1ogy at the research 
1 eve 1 .
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Fq simp] i f y, these vreuo 11 s aga i nst pos i t i v i sm have cen ter ed
a r o u n d t w o major issues. T h e f i r s t is t h a t t h e a d o p t i o n o f t h e
above tenets of pos i t i v i sm in the soc i a] sc i ences restr i c ts i ts
subject matter to visible and observable events and actions in the
socia 1 wor1d. The critics point out that this i1iegitimateIy
ignores the concern with the unobservab1e entitles and processes,
n ame 1 y, the explication of social ac t or' s% su b j e c t i v e me an i n os
(Weber, Winch, Mead, Blurner and Schutz etc,) and the exploration
of the st ructural forms of social life th s tr uc t u r a 1 ists and
realists). Second!y, the so-ca 1 led post-positivist phi1osophers
of science have all poi ntecl to the fact that the posi t i v i st i c
conception of science is seriously misconstrued, in that their
description of actua 1 scientific practice is itse1f inaccurate
Ku hn and F e ye rabe n d etc.), and that the i r understan ding of the
p r ocesses of sc 1 e n t i. f i c e x p 1 an a t i on is logical! y m i sc on c e i v e d i n
the first place (Althusser, Quine, Messes, Bhaskar etc
While these two issues can be separated for ana1yt i c a 1
purposes, any serious a11empt to reconstruct an adequate socia 1
theory must give due attention to both. If we accept that the
process of scie n tific inquiry includes both t h e cont ext of
dis cove r y and the c ont ext of v a1idatio n, an d if we r ej ec t the
p o sitivis t s conception of them, t he n we must provIde an
alternative logic of discovery and justification. Schutz7s work
has of ten been interpreted as part of the above men t s oned revo1t
against positivism. This is at best a ba 1f truth, for Schutz
did not reject everything from what in his eyes positivism has to
offer, as B. Thomason says, Schutz•' s work exh i b i t s a pr of ound
commitment to understanding the common-sense meaningfuIness of
everyday life and building an objective social science upon that
understanding.M It is indeed no exaggeration to say ihat the
22. See for instance P. Fiimer et al, 1972; J. D. Douglas ed,,
1970; W. Outwaithe, 1975; 6iddens, 1976; and M. Rogers, 1983
etc.
23. In Thomason, 1982, p.9.
Chapter I
main purpose of Schutz's very first book, Iha Ehfinomaaalagy Of Xiia
Social Uocld, is to provide a logic of validation (or a
philosophical foundation) for an interpretative sociology that has
meaningful social action as its subject matter. The extent to
which Schutz has succeeded in furnishing that, as well as its
relevance for the reconstruction of social theory, will be the
content of the following analysis.
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CHAPTER TWO
VERSTEHEN, MEANINGg AND ACTION
2.1 INTRODUCTION
At the end of the last chapter I have suggested that Schutz's
work has often been misinterpreted as or appropriated to
legitimize certain anti-positivist approaches, As Holzner rightly
remarks that the rubric xphenomenological sociology' is a catch¬
all term used by nearly all those who are not satisfied with the
practice of mainstream socio1ogy, So far as Schu tz is concerned
this is not entirely correct, A more correct view is to balance
this interpretati on w i t h anot h e r, n am e 1 y, a. s a k i n d of r e s p on s e
w i t h i n the social scientific c omm u si sty p r o v o k e d b y t h e c h a 1 1 e n g e
of hermen e u tic s'5 resulting in an a 11 empt t o prove tha t its t he
social sciences-) rules of consensus and its standards of truth
for the interpretation of meaning could attain a cogency
c omp ar ab 1 e t o t h a t ac h i e v e d in t h e s 1 u dy of n a t u r e. Putts n g t h e
ma11 er this way, it is pos ss b1e t o ar que t ha t n e i the r Webe r n or
Sc h u t z can be r e gar de d as si rnp 1 y an t i ~p os i t i v i s t i c of an t i-
hermene u t i c a 1, they are both at one and the same time, stranq1ed
and struggled w i th i n a 'dual v i s i onwh i c:h they s tro ve to
transcend. It would indeed be naive to say, as Thomason did, that
!'Schutz never displayed any great intellectual discomfort about
his position, Of course Sc h u t z d i d n o t. se 1 f- c on sc i ou s 1 y h o 1 d on
to two inc omp a tib1e philosophical p remise s, who e1se wou1d ap art
f r ofTi t h e intellectual sc h i zophr e n i c? But re gr e t tab 1 y, he i s
certainly more aware of the Kantian dilemma than many of his
con temporaries and most of his successors. As we shall see, this
Kantian dilemma lies at the very heart of the present crisis in
sociology. One can agree or disagree with Schutz's reso1ution to
this basic problem of the Nmoral sciences7, but one cannot
1. B. Holzner, 1974, p.287,
2. 2. Bauman, 1978, p.14.
3. B. Thomason, 1982, p.14.
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appreciate his work i -f one is not even aware o-f this basic
problem.
The basic problem is, as is well known, Kant's conception of
the dual nature o-f human beings. On the one hand, man is posited
as a phenomenon' like all other natural objects that has an
empirical character, by which its ac t i on s ar e conne c t eci w i t h other
phenomena by permanent laws o-f nature; on the other hand, man is
also held to be a 'noumenon' 1 ike all other 'things in themselves'
whose essence is inaccessible to the sense, faut unlike all other
N things in themselves' it has an intelligible character whic h not
only makes him a tree and moral being but also sunderstandab 1e' by
others.
According to Kant, the ent i re phenomena 1 worid, or the wor 1d
ot appearances, must held to be wholly subject to causal
de term i nat i on, tor on 1 y a. par t i cu 1 ar k i nd ot wor 1 d cou 1 d pr esen t
itselt as an object ot experience tor human beings. Our world has
to be as it is tor what we are. We cannot conceptualise the world
in any other possible way apart from our conceptual apparatus, and
this include certain a priori menta 1 categories. But hurnan beings
were not wholly to be included within the natural order; tor man
tinds in himse 11 a tacu 1 ty by wh i ch he di st i ngu i shes h irnse 11 -from
all other things, even -from h imse It so tar as he is at tec ted by
others. This tacuity is reason.4 It is precisely in the
exercise ot th i s reason that we tind in man ac tivity as distinc t
trom mere happening; and this activity cannot be who11y explainsd
in terms ot causes and effects. In short, man has two stand
points from which he can consider himself... first, as belonging
to the world of sense, under laws of nature, and second, as
belonging to the intelligible world under laws which, independent
of nature, are not empirical but founded only on reason,
4. Quoted by G. Warnock in D. J. O'Connor ed., 1964, p.309.
5. ibid.
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It is certainly beyond the scope of the present essay to
question the metaphysical foundation of Kant's philosophy. We are
here only interested in some of the implications that can be drawn
from him.1 From a Kantian perspective then, human action can be
seen as resulting from, or ''caused' by, either natural laws or
practical reasoning. And sinee Kan t, socia 1 scien tists and
theorists have been engaging in a perennia 1 debate concerning over
the aim, nature, and 'correct' methodology about the study of
human actions. ihus there are at least two aspects of this
Kan tian 1egacy, though these two aspec ts are clearly related: one
concerning over the issue of the purpose and nature of such
studies.' In his r e nowned study R. Frie drichs C1971) ha s
contrasted the prophetic mode of sociological discourse with the
priestly mode in hi s e x ten s i v e su r v e y of Arne r i c an 1 iterature.
More recently Z. Baurnan( 1976) has epitomized the development of
modern socioloqy as a science of unfreedom in contra~distinc tion
to a genuine 'critical sociology'. R. Dahrendorf (1968) too has
s p o k e o f t h e I n c om p a t i b i 7 it y o f t h e s e t w o i n tent i o n s' (sc i e n t i f i c
versus moral) and that if socio1ogy is to be 'scientific', which
he certain1y thinks it ought to be, then a price must be paid for,
t h ou gh Dah r e n dor -f ar gu e s t h a t as an i n d i v i dual t h e sociologist
cannot and shouId not remain morai1y indifferent if he is to
6. Nor ar e we concerned w i t h the Hu sse r 1 i an t r an sc e n de n c e' of
t his Kantian dichotomy; thou gh I will not deny t he imp or tanc e
of this on Schutz.
7. The i ssu e wh e t h e r h urnan c on du c t is be 11 e r e x p 1 a i n e d by 'cause
o r% r e a s o n' h a s b e e n a central c o n c e r n i n w h a, t i s k n ow n a s
the phi 1osophy of action. Rejecting both behaviorism and
de terminism (and hence a 1 so socio1ogism), most ac tion
philosophers have sought to maintain the position that the
proper understanding of human action has to be regarded as a
'philosophical' and 'moral' inquiry rather than a
'scientific' one. See Won Wr i gh t, 1971; A. R. White e d.,
1968; Winch, 1958; Louch, 1969 etc,, For sociologically
informed discussions of them see Giddens, 1976; Bernstein,
1976; M. Roche, 1973; and K. Dixon, 1973 etc.
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protect himself and others from the unintended consequences of his 
actions. Yet it is p r e c i s e l y  this 'role device'* i ,e. 5 the idea 
that the soc i o 1 09 i s t qua soc i o 1 og i s t must play a ' sc i e n t i t i c •' r o 1 e 
while at the same time as a human being and a member of society he 
may play whatever role he likes, as an access to objectivity that 
is the subject of Friedrich's and others-' trenchant attack.
Schutz's stance here is close to Dahrendorf■"s (both are 
heavily influenced by Weber), though nowhere has Schutz formulated 
the issue as clearly as Weber before him and Dahrendorf after him 
did. The second aspect of the Kantian legacy has to do with the 
nature of the subject matter and the corresponding methods wi th 
which we cars grasp social reality.
2.2 THE DEBATE OVER THE STATUS OF 'VERSTEHEN' AS A SCIENTIFIC
METHOD IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
The debate over the 'scientific'- status of verstehen as a 
legitimate and necessary method in the study of human behavior- 
can, without exaggeration, be regarded as one of the central 
p r ob1ems i n th e phi1osop h y of t he soc i a 1 sciences; for the rev o]t 
against positivism is nothing apart from the claim that the 
scientist cannot gain access to a symbolically prestructured 
reality through observation alone. And the various responses of 
the social scientists to the challenge posed by the rise of 
hermeneutics amounts to an attempt to avoid the dangers of 
subjects v i srn an d r e 1 a t i v i sm latent in the he rme n e u t i c a 1 t r ad i t i on 
since Dilthey. As Schutz sees it, this is essentially a. tension 
between the objective and subjective meaning contexts, and his 
central problem is therefore "how is it possible to form objective 
concepts and an objectively verifiable theory of subjective 
meaning structures?"^ (1962:62)
To start with, Schutz employs the terms 'subjective-' and 
'objective' meaning differently from the positivists. Whereas the
8. Hereafter, the origins of Schutz's citations will be given
in backets immediately after them.
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positivists define 'subjective-' meaning as the private intention
of the individual social actor, which is inaccessible to the
social sc i e n t i s t, and 'objective-' meaning is seen as being
produced when social action is described in precise, 'scient i f i c'
terms defined by the social scientists and divorced from social
actor's concepts; Schutz's conceptions of both are
intersubjective, that is to say, constituted in the context of the
shared meanings of a particular 'finite province of meaning-'.'
Op er a t i n g within the pos i t i v i s t conception of 'subject i v e'
and 'objective' meaning, T„ Abel (1948), E, Nagel (1961), C.
Hempe1 (1955), and R. Rudner (1966) etc, have all claimed that the
method of verstehen, understood as empathetic understanding, is
neither indispensable in the discovery of know1edqe and altogether
illegitimate in the justificatory context; and that the
' su b j e c t i v i s t s-', Weber i n c 1 u de d, have si mp 1 y c on f 1 a t e d t h e c on t e x t
of discovery with the context of validation in the process of
scientific investigation, The following passage of E, Nagel's is
p e r haps the most representative s t a t emen t of t h e i r positioni t he
fact that the social scientist... is able to project himself by-
sympathetic imagination into the phenomena he is attempting to
understand, is pertinent to questions concerning the origins of
his explanatory hypothesis but not to questions concerning their
va 1idity. His ability to enter into relations of empathy with the
human actors in some social process may indeed be heuristically
important in his efforts to invent suitable hypothesis which will
explain the process. Nevertheless, his empathic identification
with those individuals does not, by itself, constitute knowledge.
The fact that he achieves such identification does not annul the
need for objective evidence, assessed in accordance with logical
principles that are common to all controlled inquiries, to support
his imputation of subjective states to those human agents.
9. However, it must be bear in mind that Schutz did not always
employ the two terms in a consistent manner, and his
inconsistency and ambivalence in this regard constitutes a
constant danger.
10. E. Nagel, 1951, p.484.
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To the extent that the reproduction of or i q i n a'! me an i n o an d
intention was indeed what Di1 they and his followers advocated,
this criticism as put f orward by the p ositivis t s is not on I y
justified but may even be regarded as not strong enough. As early
as 1932 Schutz has already argued convincingly that complete
reproduction of intended meaning presupposes complete
identification of two minds which is impossible both in principle
and in practice. In his own words, t)he postu1 ate.,. that I
can observe the subjective experience of another person precisely
as he does is absurd. For it presupposes that I myself have lived
through all the conscious states and i n t e n t ion a! Act s whe r ein this
experience has been constituted.... In short, my stream of
consciousness would have to coinside with the other persons,
which is the same as saying that I should have to be the other-
person.... 'Intended me an i n g is t h e r e f or e... e sse n t i a 1 1 y
inaccessible to every other individuals. (1972;99)
In an important article originally published in 1954, Schutz
sough t to c 1 ar i f y the not i on of s ver stehen, i ts impor tance and
its status in the social sciences. Schutz starts his discussion
by acknowledging a number of fundamental issues which he finds
himself happily in full agr e erne n t w i t h (1962 :51 Nage 1 an d
Hemp e 1. He accepts that all ernp i r i c a 1 k n ow ledge i n v o 1 v e s
discovery through processes of controlled inference, and that it
must be statable in propositional form and capable of being
verified by anyone who is prepared to make the effort to do so
through observation (1962:51), though f or h irn ernp i r i ca 1
observation has a much wider meaning— it is not to be restricted
to sensory perceptions of objects and events in the outer world
but include the experiential form, by which common-sense thinking
in everyday life understands human actions and their outcome in
terms of their underlying motives and goals. (1962:65) He also
agrees that theory7 means in all emp i r i c a 1 sc i e n c e s t h e e x pi i c i t
formulation of determinate relations between a set of variables in
terms of which a f air1y ex tensive cI ass of empirica11y
ascertainable regularities can be explained. (1962:51-52) And
further that neither the fact these regularities have in the
social sciences a rather narrowly restricted universality, nor the
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tact that they permit prediction only to a rather limited extent,
constitutes a basic difference between the social and the natural
science, since many branches of the 1 a 11er show the same
•features. (1962:52) And -finally, that while Nagel misunderstands
Weber, he is right in stating that a method which would require
that the individual sc i e n t i -f i c observer i de n t i t y hi rnse 1 -f w i t h t h e
social agent observed... would merely lead to an uncontrolIable
p r i v ate an d su b j e c t i v e i mage i n t h e m i n d o-f t h i s p art i c u 1 ar
student of human a-f-fairs, but never to a scienti-fic theory.
(1962:52)
Given Sc h u t z s c on c e p t i on o-f soc i o 1 oqy as a science o-f h uman
behavior in what Friedrichs would regard o-f as a priestly mode,
the abov e similarities i n wh i c h h e -f i n ds h i mse 1 f in c or dial
company with the positivists are hardly surprising, if not
actually u n a v o i d a b 1 e. Y e t d e s p i t e t h i s c ornrn o n g r o u n d w h i c h the y
share there are substantia1 discrepancies between them. The most
important one being not concerned with the goal o-f the social
sciences as such but with the nature of the subject matter itself.
Wh i 1 e some positivistically i n c 1 i r. e d soc i o 1 og i s t s would hestitate
with Schutzys 1932 conception of the task of sociology as to
ana1yse the meaning struciure of the socia 1 worId (1972:13),
none of them would pause to accept that it is indeed the business
of the socia 1 scien tist s to obtain organised know1edge of socia1
reality. (1962:53) Social reality is in turn defined as the
sum total of objects and occurrences within the social cultural
world as experienced by the common-sense thinking of men living
their daily lives among t h e i r f e 1 1 ow-rnen, connected w i t h t hem i n
manifold relations of interaction. It is the worId of cultural
objec15 and social institutions into which we are born, within
11. I am not here suggesting that there is anything like a
'vradical break' between the early and the latter works of
Schutz. Most commentators on Schutz agree that Schutz's
works exhibit a remarkable degree of temporal consistency.
But overall consistency is not incompatible with minor
changes or shift of emphasize. In any case the two phrases
quoted above are for Schutz synonymous.
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wh i ch we have to find our bearings, and w i th h i ch we have to come
10 term. From the outset, we, the actors on the social scene,
experience the world we 1ive in as a world both of nature and of
culture, not as a private but as an intersubjective one, that is,
as a world common to everyone; and this involves
intercommunication and 1anquaqe, 1962:53)
According to Schutz, it is the inherent properties of the
social sciences that make verstehen a necessary methodological
device. The goals of the natural and social sciences are the
same; but since their subject matter differ, they require
different methodological strategies. The facts, data, and events
with which the natura1 scientist has to dea1 are just facts, data,
and events within his observational field but this field does not
xme an' anything to the molecules, atoms, and electrons therein.
U962:5) On the other hand, the facts, events, and data before
the social sc i entist are of an entire 1y different structure. His
observational field, the social world, is not essentially
structureless. It has a particular meaning and relevance
structure for the human beings living, thinking, and acting
therein. They have p r e se 1 e c t e d an d p r e i n ter pre ted t h i s wor 1 ci by a
series' of common-sense constructs of the reality of daily life,
and it is these t h ou gh t ob j e c t s wh i c h de t e rrn i n e their be h a v i or,
define the goal of their action, the means available for attaining
them— in brief, which help them to find their bearings within
their natural and social-cultural environment and to come to terms
with it.( 1962:5-6) 1n oiher words, socia 1 reality, or society
— the subject matter of sociology~~ is not to be conceived of as
a physical object whose existence in independent of the way
members define the situation. Instead, society is to be regarded
as the sum total of these common-sense constructs, One cannot
mistake the Kantian tinge here: even if society is a reality Ssui
ge n e ris', as a thing-in-itself it is u n k nowab1e by us; and f r om
the xphenomeno1ogica 1 standpoint what is knowabl© is the way
society is conceived of by its members. Schutz continues: Nature
as the object of the natural sciences does not meant precisely the
same thing as Nature as a constitutive element of the life-world.
That which the naively human being takes for natural reality is
not the objective world of our modern natural sciences; his
conception of the world, as valid for him in its subjectivity,
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obtains with all its gods, demons, etc. Nature in this sense, as
a. n element of the lite -wor Id, is t h u s a concep t wh i c h has it s
place exclusively in the mental sphere, (1962:127) And -further,
the lite-world is a subjective -formation resulting -from the
activities of the experiencing pre-scient i f i c life, It is
consequently errorreous if the social sciences contend with the
natural sciences for an equal warrant, As soon as they grant to
xhe natura 1 sciences their objec tivit y as their own independent
attribute, the social, sciences themselves fall into objectivism,
for only mind has being in itself and is independent, To regard
nature as something in itself alien to mind and then to found the
cultural sciences on the natural sciences, and thus supposedly to
make exact, is an absurdity, (1962:131) From a more strict
Husserlian phenomeno1ogica1 point of view, one can argue that
Schutz is not radical enough. For a vpure-' phenomenal og i st would
not even accept the Nobjectivity' of the natural world that Schutz
assigns so easily to the natural sciences. But for the student of
soc i e t y, the I mp or t of Sc h u t z s ar gurne n t here is we 11 taken,
Granted this peculiar feature of the social sciences, Schutz
contends that positivism and behaviorism are therefore logically
inadequate and defective in so far as they are simply transplanted
into social scientific investigations without modifications,
thereby barring themselves from social reality, whose central
features are intersubjectivity, interaction, and
in ter communic a tion.
Foreshadow i ng May Brodheck 's of t c i ted article on Mean i nq
and Action, Schutz in 1932 already realised that there -are many
levels of meaning-interpretations, and lamented that different
schools of thought are each choosing one of these levels of
interpretation as a starting point. Each school then develops a
methodology suitable to that level and initiates a whole new line
of research. The level or structure of meaning which was the
12. Originally published in Philosophy of Science, vol. 30, 1963,
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starting point soon gets defined as the exclusive. subject
matter of sociology, (i972:10) This description is only all the
more vivid when applied to the contemporary sociological scene,
I he result is simply chaos and confusion over fundamental concepts
wh i ch not on 1 y makes i n ter-' school commun i cat i on d i f f i cu 1 t to
come by hut a 1 so stunts scientific gr owth. Schu tz poin ts out that
both the positivists and the subjectivists failed to distinguish
clear! y be tween Uerstehen (i) as an experiential f orm of cornrnon-
sense knowledge of human affairs, 2) as an epistemological
prob 1 em, and 3) as a me thod pecu 1 i ar to the soc i a 1 sc i ences,
(1962:57) Thus one can say that Schutz explicitly tried to tackle
t he pr ob1 ems of intersubjectivity and me anin g in t h ree related,
bu t an a 1 y t i c a 1 1 y different, 1 e v els, n ame 1 y, ernp i r i c a 1 1 y 5
phi1osophica11y, and methodological 1y. These three levels are
related, indeed inter-re1ated, for if the elucidation of
i n t e r su b j e c t i v i t y at the ernp i r i c a 1 level is t h e proper goal of t h e
social sciences, then the social scientists must provide objective
categories that cap ture the meaning of common-sense typifications
understandab 1e by both 1aymen and fellow-scien11sts a 1ike, And
all these are only possible because intersubjectivity exists at
the primordial level of our existence.
In postu1 ating verstehen as a 'fact' of everyday life Schutz
here converges with what has been called as the 'ontological turn-'
of the hermeneutica1 movement signified by Heidegger, that is, the
view that understanding is no longer seen as a methodological
device whose employment is the sole privilege of the social
scientists but a regular practice of all 'normal' members of
society sharing and participating in a common form of life, In
other words, to the extent that the social scientist's verstehen
is essentially the same as our everyday understanding of each
other-- to the extent that the social scientists share our
schemes of typifications— then verstehen, instead of being only
a 'method', is a condition of there being any social phenomenon at
all. But before we come back to these different meanings of
verstehen and levels of intersubjectivity in a little bit more
detail we must first examine and clarify some of Schutz's key
concepts, not the least because these concepts form the bedrock on
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which his whole philosoph i cal and me thodological ed i -f i ce gr ounds.
2.3 BASIC CONCEPTS OF SCHUTZ'S xCONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY'
Schutz started his first, and the on 1y comp1 e t e, book with
philosophical re-flections on Weber's methodological writings.
According to Schutz, We ber' sconcept of the me an i n gf u 1 act of the
individual-- the key idea of interpretive sociology-- by no
means defines a. primitive, as he think it does. It is... a mere
label for a highly complex and ramified area that calls for much
further study. 19 72: 7-8) In v i ew of We be r s amb i gu i ties, Sc h u t z
sought as his task to delineate the precise nature of the
phenornenon of meaningful action, and he be 1 i eved that Husser 1' s
and Bergson's works provide the necessary (if not always
sufficient) intellectual resources to solve the crucia1 prob1 ems
raised a 1 rnost inadvertently by Weber. But we must note that
even at this early stage of his intellectual development Schutz
did not take Weber's problematic as an end in itself; rather, it
is treated as a heuristically necessary step to unravel the
c omp1e xitie s of socia 1 reality, Ashe wro t e: On 1y at t e r we have
a firm grasp of the concept of meaning as such will we be able to
analyse step by step the me anin g-str uc ture of the socia 1 won 1d.
(1972:13) This aim of Sc h u t z' s is reflected in t he v e ry
13. N. P. Peri tore (1975) has argued that a synthesis based on
Husserl and Bergson can be nothing more than an
'v uncomf or tabl e marr i age' (p. i 38). For to ma i n t a in the
Bergsonian position that only the past experience is
meaningful, Schutz must reject the noematic element in the
intentional stream of consciousness, thus destroying the
Husserl i an notion of the unity of the noematic: and noetic
aspects of consciousness. Peri tore's argument is
debatable, in veiw of the obscurities in this (as well as
other) aspects of Husserl's work. We must here confine
ourselves not to whether such a. synthesis is possible or
not, but to its methodologica1 implications.
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organisation of his 1932 book. After a preliminary clarification
of Webers basic concepts Schutz went on to discuss at length the
constitution of meaningful lived experience, first in the actor's
own stream of consciousness, and then an Alter Ego was also
brought into the picture, He then devoted a lengthy chapter on
the structure of the social world. And in the final chapter he
re-examines several methodological problems of an interpretive
socio1ogy. In this section we are primari1y coneerned with his
discussion of the con stitut ion of meanin gf u1 act;on.
For Schutz, the precise nature of the phenomenon of meaning
has to be revea1ed by an ana 1ysis of the constituting function of
our consciousness. This constituting function can best be grasped
by contrasting two kinds of attitudes with which one may regard
one's own stream of experience. On the one hand, I can look upon
the worId presenting itse1f to me as one that is comp1eted,
constituted, and to be taken for granted. When I do this, I leave
ou t of my awar eness the i n t en t i on a 1 ope r- a t i on s of my con sc i ou sness
within whicb the i r meanings have aiready been constituted. At
such times I have before me a world of real and ideal objects, and
I can assert that this world is meaningful not only for me but for
you, for us, and for everyone.... On the other hand, I can turn
my glance t oward the intentional ope r a tions of my c onsciou sne ss
whic h originally c onf er r ed t he meanings. Then I no longer h av e
bef ore me a comp1ete and constitu ted wor1d but one which on 1y now
is being constituted and which is ever being constituted anew in
the stream of my enduring Ego: not a world of being, but a world
that is at every moment one of becoming and passing away or
better, an emerging world. As such, it is meaningful for me in
virtue of those me anin g-en dowing intentional acts of which I
become aware by a reflective glance. 1972:36)
The above passage makes it abundantly clear that in everyday
life, operating within the Nnatural attitude', we experience life
as a stream of flow whose continuity expresses a constant
transition from one moment to another. To remain in the natural
attitude is to i rnrne r se oneself w i t h i n h i sh e r own s t r e am o f
consciousness. In other words, when we live within the meaning-
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end owin g acts themselues e xpe r i en c e in d u ratio n i s no t re g ard ed a s
either being discrete or well-defined. But it is possible to step
back, The actor, by 'a painful effort'' of reflection, is able to
direct hisher gaze at the inner stream of consciousness. More
specifically, by xbracketing' the natural world its naive
attitude, experiences are no longer treated as pure duration;
instead, they can be apprehended, distinguished, brought into
relief... become objects of attention as constituted
experiences, (1972:51.) In short, within the natural standpoint
experience itself is taken for granted as not in need of further
analysis. By contrast, the reflective attitude signifies a change
of attention which transforms what has been taken for granted into
something prob1ematic a 1,
But there are limits to what can be brought under reflective
attention. Apart from the practical impossibility of bringing
everything under consideration all at once, there is on top of
that the logical impossibility of reflecting on the 'Here and
N ow•'. 7 o q u o t e S c h u t z a q a i n,( m a n y o f m y e x p e r i e n c e s a r e n e v e r
reflected upon and remain prephenomenal.... (E)ach Act of
attention to one's stream of duration may be compared to a cone of
light. This cone illuminates already elapsed individual phases of
that stream, renderinq them bright and sharp1y defined (and, as
such, meaningful).... Each Here and Now... are never caught in
the cone of light.... On the contrary... the actual Here and
Now of the living Ego is the very source of the light. (1972:70)
This is indeed a spendid analoqy!
So meaning itse1f is inseparab1e with this constituting
function. Not only is our stream of experience beyond our
recognition without this function, the whole world around us is
senseless without it. Schutz (following Husserl and Weber) is
Kantian enough to be'iseve that the world of noumena, of the
things~in-themse1ves, is forever impenetrable by the human mind,
and it is therefore senseless to talk of the xnatural world-7. All
objects that are presented in front of the subject are knowable
only in their phenomenal aspects, where phenomena refers to that
which is given in the perception or consciousness of the Ego.
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Phenomenology has of ten been charged as celebrating a kind of
resurrected idealism. In defense phenomenologists reply that in
0 a-'' s strictly concerned with' phenomena, phenomeno 1 oqy
is ontoIogica 11y neutral; it simply says nothing about extra-
mental reality. And when that aspect of extra-mental real ity is
brought into focus it can no longer remain extra-mental. Thus the
charge, if directed exclusively at the on tol og i c al' level, is
un f ounde d. Phenomeno1ogy doe s not dea 1 wit h rea 1 i ty direct 1 y;
'reality is a matter of concern only in so far as it is
intended, represented, intuited or conceptually thought. Thus
c on sc i ou sn ess is our sole me d i um of ac c e ss t o wh a t e v e r s r e a 1 1 y
exists. Al1 coneiousness is always consc i ousness of something,
w h i c h is an o t h e r w a y o f s a y i n g that all c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s
in ten tion a1, Intentional i ty de sc ribes t he r e1 ationship betwee n
consciousness and object, it is the bridge that links
consciousness with objects? it involves consciousness of a
p ar ticu1ar objec t an dor c onsciousn e ss of c er t ain ex perie nc es,
Though the c onc ep t of constitution' pi ays a key ro1e in
Sen u t z s work, a ga in he is not t h or ou gh 1 y p h e n ome n o 1 og i c a 1 en ou gh.
For Husser1 and his more x f aith f u1' foil owe rs, ultimately the Ego
is a c e rt ain meanin g that needs to be explained. As an objec t of
experience, the self is sufficiently known when the individua 1
senses i ts si gn i f i cant consi stency and, rel.at i ve to past
experiences, its certainty, Striving for consistency of
judgement and for certainty is thus a characteristic which is part
of the general striving of the ego for self-preservation ,The
ego reacts to everything which is ultimately a striving toward
u nrnoda 1 i se d certainties, amon g wh i c h are c e r t a i n t i e s of
judgement. Through such striving the Ego struggles to achieve
a unique i den tity, which is carried ou t via a series of
intentional acts. Schutz however deliberately abstains himself
•from this line of thinking. Noting the difference between some
phenomenoloqists and himself, he exclaims that: At the beginning
of phenomenology, constitution meant clarification of the sense-
14. Husser1, 1964, p.28; quoted in M. Rogers, 1983, p,23.
15. Husserl, 1973, p.291) in Rogers, 1983, p.45.
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structure of conscious life, inquire into sediments in respect of
their history, tracing back all cogitata to intentional operations
of the on-going conscious life... But unobstrusively... the
idea of constitution has changed from a clarification of sense-
structure, from an exp1ication of the sense of being, into the
foundation of the structure of being: if has changed from
explication into creation. 1966i83)
fhis difference notwithstanding, Schutz has certainly made
good sociological use of the idea of Ninternal time
consciousness'. Schutz is probably the first social scientist to
I: -a v e e x p 1 o r e d s y s tern at i c a 1 1 y t h e e 1 e m e n t o f t i m e a n d i t s
imp 1ications in the understanding of human action. And the
theoretical and methodological importance of this fundamental
insight can never be over emphasised. What Schutz is actua 1 1 y
saying is that contrary to mo st common-sense unde rstan ding,
experience i n itseIf is basical1y meaningless. Meaning does not
r eside in exper i ence per se. Rather, onIy t hose exper i ence which
are passed can be grasped reflective1y and so rendered meaningfu1
f r orri t h e present p o i n t o f v i e w o f t h e Ego. S o i n i n d i v i d u a 1
consciousness as in historical c on sciousness, the xcun ning of
r e a s o n'' rules w here t) h e ow 1 o f M i n e r v a s p r e ads it s w i n q s o n 1 y
w i t h the falling of the du sk.
The impor tance of this insight is three-fold: Fir si1y, the
problem of meaning is basically a. time problem, one cannot
therefore simply speak of the intended meaning as attached to a
piece of action, for the simple reason 11, a c t h e rno an i n g of an
action is different depending on the point in time from which it
is observed. As Schutz says, the question of what is the
intended meaning of an act already performed requires one answer,
whereas the question of the meaning of the concrete action first-
intended requires another.... (The) person's attitude toward his
plan will necessarily differ from his a11itude toward the finished
16. It almost goes without needing to say that this famous phrase
comes from Hegel's Philosophy of Right.
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deed....' fhings 1 ook d i ff eren t the morn S ng af ter (i 972; 65)
Secondly, j f meaning is a certain way of directing one's gaze
at an i tem of one' s own stream of exper i ence whereby this item i s
'selected ou t' -from the f 1 ow, then the usual d i st i nc t i on be tween
action and behavior cannot be sustained since both are meaningless
in itself. But to say this is not tantamount to saying that
'action-' and 'behavior-' cannot be 'meaningfully-' distinguished, it
merely says that we need a new way of defining them, if these two
terms are to be analytically useful. As Schutz employs the terms,
action is conduct devised in advance on the basis of a
p r e c on c e i v e d project; wh ere it i s not it i s s i rnp 1 y be h a v i or: wh a t
distinguishes action from hehavior is that action is the execution
of a projected act... the meaning of any action is its
corresponding projected act, 1972:61) At first sight, this
might a ppe ar t o b e c ont r adietor y t o what we ha v e said b e f o re.
Had we not said that only from the point of view of the
retrospective glance do there exist discrete experience, and only
the already experienced is me anin gf u1? Closer in sp ection re ve a1s
that this paradox is more apparent than real. How is this so?
The resolution lies in the insight that a)11 projecting consists
in anticipation of future conduct by way of phantasying, yet it is
not the ongoing process of ac tion hut the phantasied act as having
been accomp1ished which is the starting point of all projecting,
1962:20) In other words, what is projected is always the act,
considered as the outcome of action or 'the finished deed', which
is the goal of action and which is brought into being by the
action and which is coneeived of in the future perfeet tense. We
are conscious of an action i «e,, rendering it meaningful) only if
we contemplate it as already over and done with, as an act. The
subjective meaning of any action is its corresponding projected
act, meaning' and 'action' are not simply 'attached' to each
other, they are inseparable and constitutive of one another.
But perhaps the most important consequence of this time
perspective is that it sheds new light on the relationship between
project and motive. Schutz argues that in both ordinary speech
and Weber's interpretive sociology the term 'motive' is not
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precise enough; with the result that two different sets of
motives' are often confused, Schutz argues that each act has an
N i n-or der-t o' as well as a s because'' motive. Whereas the i n-
order-to motive is oriented toward the future and N sub j ec t i ve 1•'
constituted, the because motive refers to the past and deals only
wit h those p he nomen a s obje ctiv e1y'' causin q the sp ecifie d ac tion.
From the point of view of the actor this class of motives (the
in-order-to motives) refers to the future. The state of affairs
to be brought about by the future action, pre-phan tas i ed in its-
project, is the in-order-to motive for carrying out the action,
(1962:22) Here the motivational context is by definition the same
as t h e me anin g-c ontext wit hin which a par tic u1ar ac tion stands in
virtue of its status as the project of and act for a given actor.
On the other hand, because motives refers from the point of view
of the actor to his past experiences which have determined him to
act as he did. What is motivated in an action in the form of
'bee au se' i s t h e p r o j e c t of the ac t i on i t se 1 f. (1962:22) As an
examp 1e Behutz argues that if the in-order-to motive of a murderer
was to obtain money of the victim, then among his because motives
one may suggest his childhood experience. But Schutz is not
always clear whether the because motive is one which is seen from
the point of veiw of the actor himself or some other observers.
The purpose of this section would be fulfilled if I have
clarified the main themes and concepts of Schutz's constitutive
phenomenology'. And I have done so in a largely expository
fashion rather than in a critical and evaluative manner, which
must be reserved for in the final chapter. The immediate1y
following chapter will have as its central concern Schutz's





ye have already seen that according to Schu12's theory of
cons t i t u t i on i nd i v i du a. 1 s mu s t reflect upon their lived exp er i enc e s
in order to render them meaningful. One consequence of this is
that since meanings are, strictly speaking, only constituted
wi thin each i nd i v i dua 1 s un i que stream of consc i ousness, Weber' s
notion of verstehen as the attempt to grasp the intended meaning
of the actor— as something existing in itself ready to be
objects v e 1 y•' d i sc over ed i s absu r d? f or tha t wou 1 d me an t h a t
my st ream of consciou sn ess wou1d have t o c oinside with t he ot her
person•'s, which is the same as saying that I should have to BE the
other person« 1972199) This argumen t is also app1 icable to
ongoing or future actions, for only the actor knows the span of
his own pro j ec ts. Thus the ohser ver has ne i t her knowledge of the
projecting preeding the ac tor's action nor of the context of a
h i qher unit i n wh i c h i t s t ands. He kno ws mere! y t ha t f r aqmen t of
the ac tor s ac t i on wh i ch has beeome man i f est to him, name 1 y the
performed act observed by him or the past phases of the still
ongoing action.... In order to understand' what I, the actor,
meant by my ac ti0n he wou1d have t o start fr om the 0bser ved act
and to construct from there my underlying in-order-to motive for
the sake of wh i ch I did what he observed,11 1 962:24)
This passage contains the kernel of Schutz's methodology; and
a detailed analysis of the above passage quoted must be suspended
for the time being Suffice it here to say that Schutz•s theory
of constitution is inherently subjective, as a result,
c omp r e h e n din g t h e in t en de d me aning of the other self„,. c ou 1 d
never be acheived. (1972:98) But if this is the case then how do
we know that we can understand another person? In what sense and
to what extent can we say that two or more people share a common
meaningful reality? In short, Schu tz's theory of meaning
inevitably makes intersubjectivity problematic. And he must
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reconcile this be-fore he can go beyond the solitary ego so as to
build a phenornenol og i cal social science,
3.2 THE PROBLEM OF iNTERSUSJECTIUITY
•o put it as simple as it can be, intersubjectivity refers to
our knowledge of others. Both 'knowledge'' and sothers'' however
require further elaboration. This Nother7 can refer either to a
single other-- an alter ego, or it can refer to the community as
a whole--- what George Herbert Mead calls the Ngeneralised other';
it can refer to an other's action, utterance, andor his who1e
self, vKnow 1 edge' i n an i ntersubjec t i ve setting cannot be def i ned
simp 1y as Erkenntnis icognitive knowledge); rather, it must be
concerned with Erlebnis subjective experience as lived. Our
knowledge of others is mixed up with our feelings, attitudes and
purposes towards them, with elements that are often not cognitive
at all. Thus defined, the problem of intersubjectivity can be
su bd i v i de d i n t o two q u e st i ons: .1) How is it possible that th e
alter ego is constituted in the ego and yet as an independent ego
a 1 so const i t u t e s t he original ego in his own stream of
consciousness? (2) How is the experience of a successful
communication with another possible? The latter can in turn be
seen as either a cognitive puzzle of how we can ever understand
others N correc 11y' or in a more Nmetaphysical' fashion as the
project of entering into a special kind of re1 ationship with them.
I shall designate the above identified questions as
intersubjectivity I, intersubjectivity 2a and intersubjectivity 2b
respectively. It will be argued that Schutz initial!y sought to
locate the foundation of a phenornenologica! social science in
intersubjectivity 1, but increasingly drifted toward
inter sub.i erf i v i t y 2.
Historically, the question of how intersubjectivity is to be
derived from the experience of the ego has posed notorious
difficulties for philosophy in general and phenomenology in
particular. Husserl himself was persistently uneasy with this
puzzle; and following Husserl, Schutz referred to this spectre of
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sol i ps i siTi, psvchol 09 i sm, or re 1 at i v i sm as the dark c0rner 0f
phi 1osophyj which has a 1 ways been haun tinq. i962:i24) The true
p h i 1 osop her, i.e., the phen ome no 1 og i s t, mu s t f ace t h i s s sc an da 1 of
phi1osophy, which, according to Schutz, amounts to a
consideration o-f whether the communication process is really the
-foundation o-f all poss i bl e soc i a 1 relationships, or whe ther, on
the con trary, all commun i c a t i on presupposes t he ex i s t enc e o-f some
kind of social interaction which, though it is as indispensable
c on d i t i on o-f all possible c ommun i c a t i on, doe s n01 en t er t he
communication process and is not capable o-f being grasped by it.
1964;161
It is widely accepted that the so-called ''linguistic turn-' is
the most s i gn i -f i c an t phi! osop h i c a 1 de v e 1 opme n t in t h e twe n t i e t h
century, and the focus o-f language provides a common frame o-f
reference among philosophical traditions as divergent as
Pragmatism, Ana 1ytic phi1osophy, Hermeneutics, and Habermasian
critical theory. One consequence o-f these recen t de ve 1 opmen ts i s
the convergence in accepting that the only way out o-f methodical
solipsism is to take the apriori of language commun i cat i on' as
the basis and starting point of all possible understanding. In
this context phenomenology stands almost alone in its consistent
and incessant search for the primordial conditions which make
communication possible., For this reason phenomenal og i sts are
of ten accused by other phi losoph e rs p ar tic u1ar1y ana 1ytic but
also many continental philosophers) of probing into the murky
waters of subjective conscious nessin amysti-f i e d m a n n e r, f 0 r h ow
could it be otherwise since mental events, if exists at all, are
in principle beyond the boundary of our comprehension. Husserl
would no doubt reply that to take language communication as an a
priori of understanding is to av oid the pr ob1 em of
intersubjectivity, not to solve it. So how did Husserl and Schutz
tack 1e it?
1. The phrase is taken from the title of a paper by Karl Otto
Apel in Dallmayr and McCarthy eds., Understanding and Social
Inquiry, Notre Dame, 1977.
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Following Husserl, Schutz initially approached the problem of
intersubjectivity with a theory of p e r c e ption. He p oin t s out t hat
be h avioris t s and existentialists, 1ogic a 1 p ositivists an d
phenomenologists agree.„. that knowledge of another's mind is
possible only through the intermediary of events occurring on or
produced by another's body. (1962:313-4) But the phenomenologist
dif f er s f r cm all others in that while all k nowledge of the 01 he r
must start with perception (or observable behavior), it by no
means ends with it.
Now? the cent ra 1 coneept in Husse r1's the or y of pe r c e ption
(which Schutz accepts wholeheartedly, at least in his earlier
writings) is that of appresentation or ana1ogica1 apperception.
Appresentation implies that the perception of the visible
frontside of the object involves an apperception by analogy of the
unseen backside, an apperception which, is a more or less empty
an ticip a tion of wh at we migh t perceive if we turn t he obje c t
around or if we walked around the object. This anticipation is
based on our past experiences of normal objects of this kind
But it is qu i t e possible that our an ticip a tion will be
disappointed. (1962:295) For examp 1e, when a box is presented in
front of our perceptual senses what we perceive is, strictly
speaking, nothing more than an aspect of that box which consists
of only a. few straight lines and surfaces. But as a matter of
fact we do not have to walk around it to know that it is a real,
three-dimensional object, because based on our past experiences
and pre v i ou s 1 y ac q u i r e d k n ow ledge of t h e p e r- c e i v e d ob j e c t, an y
spontaneous sensory perception is simultaneously an apperception,
Appresentation or pairing is therefore a general feature of our
consciousness. It is a form of spontaneous synthesis where two or
mor e data, one perce i ved ancl the o t her appe r c e i ved, ar e
intuitively constituted as a unity.
What makes this notion of appresentation or pairing so
central is that all significative relations are special cases of
this form of analogical apperception or appresentation which is
based upon the general phenomenon of pairing or coupling....
Thus, by appresentation, we experience intuitively something as
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i nd i ca t i nq or dep i c t i nq si gn i f i can t) y some t h i nq e 1 se. (1 962: 296)
In other words, analogical apperception is only a special case of
appre sen tation whose importance can be generalised to all forms of
significative relations. It can be generalised to the mental
grasp of recollections of past experiences, phantasies, and other
minds. Schutz argues that according to Husserl, 11 the Other is
from the outset given to me as both a material object with its
position in space and a subject with its psychological life. His
body... is given to my original perception.... his
psychological life, however, is not given to me in originary
presence but oly in copresencej it is not presented but
appresen ted. By the mere continuous visual perception of the
Other's body and its movements, a system of appresentations, of
well ordered indications of his p syc ho1ogic a 1 life and his
experiences is constituted, and here... is the origin of the
various forms of the systems of signs... and finally of language.
The phys i ca 1 obj ec t the 0then s body•', even ts occurr i ng on this
body, and his bodily movements, are apprehended as expressing the
01 h e r•' s s p i r i t u a 1 I' t ow a r d w h o s e m o t i v a t i o n a 1 m e a n i n g- c o n t e x t I
am directed, So-called sempathy' in the other person is nothing
but that form of appresentationa 1 apprehenaion which grasps this
meaning. 1962:314)
Thus far there is no essential difference between Husserl and
Schutz. Where Schutz departs from Husserl is that whereas the
latter locates the or joins of intersubjec tivity u1timate1y in the
meditating ego, albeit a transcendental one, and constituted
purely from the sources of one's intentional ity, but in such a
manner (via a series of rigorous1y performed phenomeno1ogica 11y
r e du c t i on s) t h a t it is t h e sarrie t r an see n den t a 1 i n t e r su b j e c t i v i t y
in every single human being in his intentional experiences.
Schutz situates it in the xface-to-face re 1 ationship' where both
partners share time and space, perceiving one another.
According to Husserl, the problem of intersubjectivity is
phi1osophically solved by the theory of analogical apperception
and the theory of constitutional consciousness, and the two are
intimately connected. But Schutz realised from the outset that
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the problem of intersubjectivity cannot be solved by the device of
appresen tation alone. Husserl's theory of grasp inq the Other's
mind, based as it is on the notion of pairing, is after all only
an analogy, not a genuine explanation. And even as an analogy, it
is not a successful one. For as Eugen Fink points out the
apprehension of perceptual objects has the character of
v redeemabl eness' --it is an anticipation of a possible way of
bringing the back-side of the object to originary givenness by
turning around it. However, the apperceived side of the Other--
his spiritual I'-- can never be xredeemed'' in this sense
Sc hu 12 himself cornp 1 a i ned that in terms of Husser 1' s ph i 1 osophy
the prob 1 em of the Other could be explained on 1y as are 1 ationship
between transcendental subjects. Such an explanation cannot be
found in Hu sse r 1•' s published wr i t i ngs. Doubtless, Hu sse r I sp e ak s
frequently of an intermonadic universe and thus obviously assumes
a plurality of transcendental egos. However, it is one of the
most difficult problems of phenomenology-- perhaps an insolvable
one— to reconcile the notion of THE transcendental ego as the
source of the constitution of the world with the idea of a
plurality of coexistent transcendental subjects Husserl's
fifth Car t es i an Medita tion does not show how the 01her is
constituted as a transcendental subjectivity, but as a
t r an sc e nde n t a 1 subjectivity, but me r e1y how he is con stit ut ed as a
mundane psycho-physical unity' (1962i194-5 Part of the reason
why Schutz kept transcendental phenomenology at arms length was
the qrowi n g realization that it could not provide a viab1e
solution to the philosophical problem of inter subjectivity; though
it does serve to illuminate the constitutive process, and it is
this latter part of phenomenological analysis that Schutz retained
throughout his life.
2. E. Fink, in Schutz, 1966, p.85; see also David Carr, 1973.
3. See the appended not at the end of chapter one of Schutz's
1932 book.
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And i f t he phi1osophic a1 p rob1 em of int e rsubje c tivit y c an not
be satisfactorily solved by a genius like Husserl, the onlv
alternative appears to be that we must somehow take it as an
irreducible given, This latter stance is indeed adopted by
Schutz, who concludes that inter subjectivity is not a problem o-f
constitution which can be solved within the transcendenia 1 sphere,
but is r a t h e r a datum of the life -w o r Id. It is...» the f o u n da t i o n
for all other categories of huamn experience.... (Only such an
ontology of the life-world, not a transcendental constitutional
analysis, can clarify that essential relationship of
intersubjectivity which is the basis of al1 social sciences--
even though, as a rule, it is there taken for granted and accepted
without question as a simp]e datum. 1966:82
Schu tz i s theref ore faced with a di1emma. 0n the one hand he
criticises and castigates those social scientists who naiveiy take
intersu bj e c tivit y for gr an t ed; on t h e ot he r hand he r ea 1 ises that
intersubjectivity cannot be derived from a transcendental
constitutional analysis. So in a sense, we have to accept that
inter subjectivity is an ir r e du c ab1e given, but t ha t does n ot mean
that it cannot be analysed, and still less does it mean that the
methodological foundation of the social sciences cannot and need
not be p h e nomeno1ogic a 11y grou nded on a constit u tiona 1 an a 1ysis,
Indeed, the bulk of his 1982 book and many of his later essays
aimed to do just that, As he says, we may say that the empirical
social sciences will fin d t h eir true f ou nda tion not i n
transcendental p hen ome no1ogy, but in t he c onstitutive
phenomenology of the natural attitude. (1982:149)
3.3 THE -RELATIONSHIP'
With the above quotation Schutz's sociology can rightly be
described as a constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude.
Like Husserl himself, Schutz was increasingly dissatified with the
attempt to account for intersubjectivity through the postulation
of a transcendental ego and consequently directs his attention to
the fact of intersubjectivity as a universal presumption of
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everyday experience. In relinquish! n 9 t h e hop e of f u r n i sh i n g a
philosophical proof of our knowledge of other minds Schutz resorts
° presupposition that common-sense simply takes
intersubjectivity for granted. If the genesis of
intersubjectivity cannot be the solitary ego, as it obviously
cannot, then it can only be social.
Centra] to Schutz's conception of the common-sense world is
that it is not my private world but an intersubjective one and
that, therefore, my knowledge of it is not my private affair but
from the outset intersubjective or socialised. 1962:11)
Moreover, this world was there before we were born and will
continue to be there after we die. It has been handed down to us
by our elders and has silently been accepted by us as a matter of
course. Within this attitude, the existence of others is simply
taken for granted. This is Schutzs famous sgeneralised thesis of
the alter ego-', according to which the individual ego, (fa)orn
into a social world, comes upon his fellow men and takes their
existence for granted without question, just as he takes for
granted the existence of the natural objects he encounters. The
•
essence of his assumption... (is that)s The Thou (or other
person) is conscious, and his stream of consciousness is temporal
in character, exhibiting the same basic form as mine. But of
course this has implications. It seems that the Thou knows its
experiences only through reflective Acts of attention. And it
means that the Acts of attention themselves will vary in character
from the moment to the next and will undergo change as time goes
on. In short, it means that the other person also experiences his
own aging. (1972:98)
But the postulation of the general thesis of the alter ego
does not solve the problem of understanding or intersubjectivity}
if anything, it intensifies it. For if the Thou %experiences his
own aging' means that he has his own biographically determined
situation, and if to say that his definition of the situation is
biographically determined is to say that it is the sedimentation
0f ai]... (his) previous experiences, organised in the habitual
possessions of his stock of knowledge at hand, and as such his
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unique possession, given to him and to him alone 1962:9), then
how do we know about his definition of the situation? Put it
slightly differently, if our biographical1y determined situation
determines our 'purposes at hand-', and since it is this purpose at
hand which defines our systems of relevances and typifications,
then s t r i c 11 y speaking, t h e same•' object must me am some t h i n q
different to me and to any of my fellow-men.
Accord i n g t o 8 c h u t z, c omm on-sense thinking o v e r c orn e s t h i s
difference in individual perspectives by the thesis of the
' rec i proc i ty of per spec t i ves'—- we know that our natural a11 i tude
to this world correspond to the natural attitude of other-- which
in v o1v e s two idealiz a tion s. These ide a 1iz a tions are t ak e n f or
granted r u 1 e s' of soc i a 1 life. Th e first is the idealization of
the i n terchangeab i 1 i ty of standpoints' where we assume that our
ways of experiencing a given object, though different at the
moment, would be identical in a transposition of places so that
his here' becomes mi ne and vice versa. The second ideal i zat i on
is that of the conqruency of the systern of re 1 evances', throuqh
which we assume that in spite of our unique biographical
situations, the differences in our systems of relevances can be
disregarded for our purposes at hand until counter-evidence.
Herein lies the possibility of the apprehension of objects and
their aspects actually known by me and potentially known by you as
e v e r yon e' s k n ow ledge, Such k n ow 1 edge i s c on c e i v e d to be
objective and anonymous, i.e., detached from and independent of
any of my and my fellow-man's definition of the situation, our
unique biographical c i rcurnstances and the actual and potential
purposes at hand involved there in. 1982:12)
Apar t frorn this structural socialization of know 1 edge, there
are two other aspects of the general problem of the socialization
of knowledge, namely, the social origin of knowledge and the
social distribution of knowledge. We are not here interested in
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Sc hu tz•' s con t r i bu t i on toward a restructuring of the soc i o 1 ogy o-f
k n ow ledge,4 su f f i c e it here to p o i n t out t h a tin c orn i n g t o
terms with our social world, we are continuously ordering,
classifying, and interpreting our ongoing experiences according to
various interpretative schemes. What is crucial is that these
interpretative schernes are themse Ives essen t i a 1 1 y soc i a 1 and
intersubjective. We are c on tinuous1y e n dowin q our lived
e x p e r i e n c e s w i t h meaning by choosing i n terpretat i v e sc h erne s, Bu t
these schemes are by no means intrinsic a 11y p rivat e; nor do we
usually -formulate the ways in which we typify the world in a self-
conscious manner, Most of our typifications are tacit in the
sense t h at we norma11y lack e x p1 icit awa r e ness about t he
typifications b y w hich we sir uc t ure ou r experiencs, Sin c e
typifications are shared, the understandinq of the conduc t ot
others can be examined as a process of typification, whereby the
ac t or applies learned interpretative sc herne s to grasp the
meanings of what he and others do.
But the crucia 1 prob1 em remains that our understanding of
others, via typifications and interpre ta tive schemes which are
social, can never be certain: there is on 1y a possibi1 ity that we
are right. And the general thesis of the reciprocity of
per spec tives, even if correct, is oniy a genera 1 descrip tion of
how we usual 1 y i n terpr e t others-' ac t i ons, not a genu i ne
explanation of the process of understanding as such,
It is at this point that a discussion of the W e-
relationship' becomes imperative, both because it is one of the
dimension s of the life-worId itself, and because of the ambiva 1en t
role it plays in Schutz's phenomenol og i cal sociology.
4. For the influence of Schutz in this field see Berger and
Luckmann, 1966; arid B. Holzner, 1968.
5. Our understanding of others will never reach '•empirical
certainty'... but will always bear the character of
plausibility.... We always have to 'ltake chances' and to
srun risks' (1962:33).
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What then, is this N We-re1 a tion ship7? Within Sch ut z7 s
conceptual framework, the life-world can be seen as being
stratified into several social dimensions, each with its own
distinctive spatial-temporal structures and typificatory schernes
in terms of which others are apprehended and dealt with in social
encounters. fhat is to say, the social world is apprehended by
us in con tinuum of typifications, whcih are progressive1y
anonymous as they are further and further removed away from the
here and n ow7 of the face-to-face situ ation. Nore specific a I 1y,
Schutz distinguishes the domain of directly experienced social
reality Urn we It) from the i ndi rect social worl ds of c on t ernp or ar i e s
(Mitwelt), of predecessors Vorwelt), and of successors
(FolgeweIt).
We have already noted that Schutz7s constitutional theory of
meaning is f undamen tally subjective and thus logically pr ec1udes
the possibility of ever reproducing the original state of
subjec tive feeling andor intended meaning of the 01her. Instoad,
there are different degrees of certain ty with which an observer
can conclude that a social relationship exists.... T) h e
sureness with which the outward indications can be connected with
inward subjective states itself depends on how we 11 thw observer
knows the person he is observing.... And so we have... degrees
of interpretabi1ity. (1972:154) In other words, the degree of
intimac y be twe en the observer and his Other de termines the deqree
of certainty and correctness of his interpretation of the Other.
In contra-distinction to se1f-exp1ication where on 1y passed
experiences or projected acts can be subjected to reflection, the
face-to-face situation is one where each partner, sby merely
looking7, can grasp one another7s living experience in the direct
here and now. This special feature of all face-to-face situations
allows Schutz to claim that you and I are in a specific sense
%simultaneous7, that we coexist7, that our respective streams of
consciousness interact. 1972:102) This Nsimu1taneity7 does not
refer to objective, physical oruantifiable time; rather, it is
inner duree in Bergson7s sense of the term and implies the
assumption which I make that your stream of consciousness has a
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structure analogous to mine Not only does each o-f us
subjectively experience his own duree as an absolute reality
but the duree o-f each of us is given to the other as absolute
realit y, Wo at we mean, then, by the simultaneity of two durations
or streams of consciousness is simply this: the phenomenon of
growing older together, (1972:103) But simultaneity does not
imply that exactly the same experiences are given to each of the
partners-- this is simply logically and practically impossible
and therefore, absurd— rather, it means that while each of the
partners has hisher own lived experiences inaccessible by the
Other, they share together the same vivid present. Thus although
it is true that in one sense each of the partners knows more of
himself than of the Other since only he alone knows his own
biography and span of projects, in another sense each knows more
of the Other than himself since in the face-to-face situation we
can experience the Other's acts in their vivid performance.
This face-to-face situation in it se1f h oweve r does not
guarantee the emergence of a vWe-r e 1 at i onsh i p•'. Though it is a
necessary condition for the development of the latter it is not a
sufficient one, In addition to this something else is required,
n cUTt 0 i y% reciprocated sThou-orientation' on the parts of both
participan ts.
The generalised thesis of the other self, as mentioned above,
is distinguished by a certain attitude of the ego toward the other
person's duration, that is, the other person is a being endowed
with consciousness and intentionality. That is to say, unlike
other objects we experience this second ego not as simply there
and given in and of itself, but as an alter ego: it is an Other
which, in accordance with his constitutive sense, refers back to
me, the ego of this alter ego. (1962:125) Just as hisher body-
is apperceived by me as an alter ego, so my body is similarily
experienced by himher as an Other. Schutz calls this attitude an
N0ther-orientation'. This Other-orientation can in principle be
one-sided: while it pertains to its essence to be related to an
Other, it can both exist and continue without any reciprocation on
the part of the Other. 1972:146) When this orientation is
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mutual a social relationship exists: a social relationship exists
tor me is!, whi1e maintaining an Other-orientation toward my
part n er, asc e rta in that he is, on his part, experiencing an
Other-orientation toward me» 1 can ascer tain that my partner i s
orien ted toward me, therefore, only if J first orient myse1f
toward him, (1972:156)
rhe pure mode of this 01her-orientation is what Schutz
designates as the Nihou—orientation'. It is a prepredicatiue
experience in which it is precise 1y the being there of the 0ther
toward which the Thou-orien tation is direc ted, not necessari1y the
01hers spec i f i c char ac ter i st i cs. The concep t of the Thou-
orientation does not imp1y awareness of what is going on in the
Oth e rs m i n d. In its p u r e' f orm the T h ou-or i en tat i on c on s i s t s
merely of being intentiona 1 1 y directed toward the pure being-1here
of another a 1 i ve and consc i ous human be i ng. To be sure, the
%pure' Th ou-or i e n f a t i on i s a f orrna 1 concept, an intellectual
c on struct.... In real life, we neue r e x p er i en c e the xpur e
exis tenc e' of other s. 1972:164)
Like its ximpure' counterpart, the Other-orien tation, the
Thou-orien tation can... be either one-sided or reciprocal, It
is one-sided if only one of us notices the presence of the other.
It is reciprocal if we are mutually aware of each other, that is,
if each of us is Thou-orien ted toward the other. 1972:164) The
UJe-re 1 at i onsh i pis constituted out of this mutual Thou-
or ientat i on wit hin a face-to-face situation, it is a f ace-1o-f ace
relationship in which the partners are aware of each other and
sympatheiica 11y participate in each other's live for however short
a time. (1972:164)
1n this pure N We -re 1 a tion ship' my experiences are still not
identical with those of my fellow-man with whom I interact in a
face-to-face situation (which is impossible), but we sparticipate'
in each other's conscious life. There is a community of time and
space, a synchr on i z at i on of two interior strearns of
consciousness (1964:26), as well as a direct bodily presence by
which we interpret each other's words, gestures, facial
Chapter III
expressions and movements. All genuine understand i nq is -founded
upon this 'mutual tuning-in relationship between the I and the
ihou. Ihis relationship is both non-conceptual and non-cognitive,
op rathei has non-conceptua 1 and non-cognitive dimensions-, and is
i n v o 1 v e d in all kinds of authentic c ommu n i cat i on wh e r e i h e
participants are experienced by each other as a 'We' in vivid
p r esence. In S c h u t z' s words;!! A s I loo k a t y o u in t h e c ororn unit y
o-f space and time I have direct evidence that you are oriented to
me... you experience what 3 say and do, not only in an objective
context o-f meaning but also as manifestations of my conscious life
.... In the community of space and time our experiences of each
other are not only co-ordinated but also reciprocally determined
by continuous cross-reference. I exper i enca myse1f thr ough you,
and you experience yourself through me, The reciprocal mirroring
of Se1v es in t he part ne rs ex p e r i en ce is a c on stitu tive feat u r e of
th e We-re1 a tionship in face-to-face situa tion s. (1964% 30)
Having out 1 i ned Schutzs not i on of the We-re 1 at i onsh i pwe
are now in position to assess its importance and the role it plays
i n Sc hu t z7 s ph enorne no 1 og i c a 1 soc s o 1 ogy. Bu t t h e pr ec i se f u nc t i on
of the 'We-re1 ationshipx has generated much confusion and
e ntang1ed discussion, especia 1 Iy w i t h r egar d t o i t s r e1 ationship
to the genesis of i ntersubjectiv i ty, To a certain extent, Schutz
himself must be held responsible for this ambivalence. At times
he expresses his conviction that his 'phenomeno1ogy of the natura1
a11 i tude' presupposes the so1ution of the prob1 em of
intersubjectivity at the philosophical level; but at other times
he seems to be convinced that such philosophical proof of the
existence of the Other can never be accomplished from a solitary
eqo, not even a transcendental one, Thus Fhomason has argued that
in so far as intersubjectivity 1 (in our sense of the term) is
concerned, Schutz did not really advance much beyond HusseM's
formulation; and that his contribution to this problem is
therefore sociological rather than philosophical. According to
Thomason, Schutz simply asserts that common-sen takes
intersubjectivity for granted; and Schutz's analysis of the face-
Chapter III
to—face situations simply help give PLAUSIBILITY to this naive
assumption. On the other hand, Richard Zaner7 has depicted the
sWe-re1 ationship as fundamenta1 to both the communicative process
as well as to the constitution of the other self. Unfortunately,
Zaner understated the difference between Husserl and Schutz and
consequently conflated the problem of the constitution of another
Self in the Ego, with the problem of the a priori condition of
communication, and altogether ignored the issue of
intersubjectivity 2a. The inherent paradox of Schutzs position
is perhaps best grasped and most forcefully put by Maurice
Natanson: The acceptance of the We-relationship means that the
epistemological issue of intersubjectivity is, in certain
respects, set outside the province of a phenomenology of the
natural attitude.... (T)hough we are clearly told that within
the common-sense worId of dai1y life intersubjectivity js a
primordial fact of that life and so is taken for granted by
common-sense men, still the problematic status of
intersubjectivity and its prime importance as a philosophical
theme for social science intrudes obliquely into the discussion, a
recognised, honored, but still unadmitted guest. According to
Natanson, t)he We-re 1 ationship... is in many respects a
i
primordial given for Schutz.... From the standpoint of the
transcendenta 1 attitude, it is necessary to ask, How is it
possible that there is such a structure? Within the natural
attitude the We-relationship is a fact of life, but in the
phenornenological attitude it is deeply problematic.' From the
transcendental standioint this is of course a fair question to
ask, and all the more so since Schutz himself had flirt with it.
But it is not entirely implausible to argue that intersubjectivity
is for schutz NOT a xrecognised, honored, but still unadmitted
guestj and that the We-re 1 ationship is not, for Schutz, a sfact
of life. To be sure, Schutz had abandoned the hope of solving
the problem of intersubjectivity i, the onus is on the side of
those who argue
6. Thomason, 1982, p. 72.
7. Richard Zaner, 1961,
8. M. Natanson, 1968, p. 237.
9. ibid, p. 236.
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that it is possible to ac e ou n t -for intersubjecti v j t y
transcendentally to tell us how this is to be accompi ished,
otherwise the charge is simply being irresponsible.
Schutz repeatedly reminds us that the pure We-relationahip is
only a s limiting' concept-— it is a means with which we can or asp
how mutual understanding is possible in various social encounters.
As such it is only a heuristic device and does not exactly
correspond to any concrete situation. Any particular or concrete
We-re1 ationship will exhibit numerous differences among
themselves, with varying degrees of vividness and intimacy.
Without entering into a discussion of the They-or i en tat i on' and
xThey-re1 ationship' which characterise the worlds ot
contemporaries, predecessors and successors, it is enough to point
out that -for Schutz the transition -from subjective experience to
the constitution ot the social world is facilitated by the NWe~
r e 1 a t i on sh i p'. I n sh or t, it i s p oss i b 1 e to ar gu e t h a t Sc h u t z' s
not ion of We ~r e 1 a t i on sh i p' functions as a kind of u 1 t i mat e
v a1 id atio n f o r o u r m un d a n e un der stan ding of o t h e rs. uT he
motivational context of the interaction itself derives its
validity from the direct socia1 re1 ationship, of which a11 other
interactions are mere modifications. (1972;162) As such, it has
a Nquasi-tran seendental' status-- it is not purely
transcendental, because it does not posit any assumptions beyond
the level of constitutional analysis; and it is not purely
empirical for it does not refer to any specific concrete
situation, Yet i t describes and prescribes the necessary
conditions for genuine understanding to be possible and the
necessary conditions for checking the validity of those
understandings. The following passage is worth quoting at length
to support this interpretation; The peculiarity of the face-to-
face situation... consists not in a specific structure of the
reciprocal motivation context itself but in a specific disclosure
of the motives of the other person. Even in face-to-face
interactions 3 only project in phantasy the behavior of the other-
person as I plan my own action«... I have yet to see what my
partner will actually do. But because he and 1 continually live
in the We-re1 ationship, I can actually live through and
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participate in the constitution of his mot i vat i on a 1 c on text. I
interpret the present lived experiences w h i c h I i n: p u t e to y o u as
the i n--order-to motives of the behavior I expect from you or as
the consequences of your past experiences, which I then regard as
their bec au se~mo t i ve s. I Nor i en t•' my ac t i on t o t he se mo t i v a t i on a 1
contexts of yours, as you or i en t•' your s to m i ne, Howe ver, th i s
orienting oneself' takes place within the directly experienced
soc i a 1 realm in the particular mode of 'v w i t n e ss i n q. Wh e n
interacting with you within this realm, I witness how you react to
my behavior, how you i n t er pr e t my rne an i nq, how my j n-or der-to
motives trigger corresponding because-mot 1ves of your behavior.
In between my expectation of your reaction and that reaction
itself I have Ngrown older-' and perhaps wiser.... But in the
face-to-face situation you and I grow o1der together. (1972s172)
Of course, in suggesting that Schu t z' s n o t i on of t h e x We-
relationship has a quasi-transcendenta 1 status I do not imply
that it is not thereby sadd1ed with difficu1ties and ambiguities.
I do want to argue that most previous discussions on this issue
either -presupposes the importance and the possibility of a
transcendental analysis of intersubjectivity or the impossiblity
of ever finding an anchorage for our understanding of others. To
continue with Nata n son's a n a 1oq y, w e c an say t hat
intersubjectivity 1 is only an sunadmi11ed guest' of Schutz's
party after painful consideration; and intersubjectivity 2 can be
regarded as the theme of the party~- i.e., what the party was
organised for.
A transcendental 1y constituted intersubjectivity is vital in
Husserls project for the Nquest of certainty, because in the
final analysts an Hobjective1y' valid cognition must be one that
is recognised as 'true'' not only for the subject who has the
cognition but also for any possible subject who undergoes similar
mental operations (phenomenOlogical reductions) as well.
Husserl's thesis of i n tersubjec t i ve truth therefore rests
ultimately on the idea that the essential core of an object is the
same for all men, regardless of'their i d i osyncrac i es, because our
structure of consciousness is invariable and transcendental. (he
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aim of the phenomenal og i cal, eidetic, and transcendental
reductions is to reveal the ultimate or absolute grounds o-f
knowl edge, thereby hoping to refute re 1 at i v i sm. Schu tz however
realises that this cannot be achieved, and in the end 'adequacy'
and sobject i v i ty-' replace apodictic truth in sociological
explanation if it can be shown that the sociological model is
consistent with both scientific practice and the way actors th i nK,
We close this section with the following remarks of Schutz; the
'general thesis of the alter ego7 is a description of our
experiences in the mundane sphere. It is a piece of
Nphenomenologica1 psychology', as Husserl call it in antithesis to
stranscendental phenomenology'. But the results of an analysis of
the mundane sphere. cannot be impugned by any basic assumption
(metaphysical or ontological) which might be made in order to
explain our belief in the exisitence of 01hers. Whether or not
the origin of the NWe' refers to the transcendental sphere at al1,
our immediate and genuine experience of the alter eqo within the
mundane sphere cannot be gainsaid. In any event... (it) is a
sufficient frame of reference for the foundation of empirical
psychology and the social sciences, For all our knowledge of the
social 'world world... is based upon the possibility of
experiencing an alter ego in vivid presence, (1962s175)
3.4 INTERSUBJECTIVITY AS A METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEM
We have already seen that for Schutz the subject matter of
the social sciences has to do with actors' common-sense constructs
of the life-world. If this is the case then these common-sense
constructs must form the reservoir from which scientific concepts
or thought objects can be constructed. !hus, the constructs used
by the social scientists are... constructs of the second degree,
namely constructs of constructs made by the actors on the social
scene, whose behavior the scientist observes and tries to explain
in accordance with the procedural rules of his science. (1962:6)
The basic problem inherent in such a formulation of the social
scientific enterprise is obvious, and Schutz realises that it can
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be summarised in the question. How are sciences of subjective
meaning-context possible? (1972:223) Both in his identification
as well as resolution of this prob1 em Schutz anticipates what
Anthony Giddens has referred to as tbe spec i fic characteristic of
the social sciences, namely, its x double herrneneu t i c' nature: the
social scientist studies a world which is constituted as
meaningful by those who produce and reproduce it in their
activities— human subjects. To descr i be hurnan beh a v i or i n a
valid way is in principle to participate in the -f orrn of! i f e wh i c h
constitute, and are constituted by, that behavior. This is
already a herrneneutic task, But social science is itself a Morm
of life', with its own technical concepts. Herrneneutics hence
enters into the social sciences on two, related levels. 10 The
implication is that what is needed on the conceptual level is that
the social scientist's constructs must be determined by both the
actors' concepts and the concepts of the scientific community.
Indeed, this is exactly the strategy adopted by Schutz in his
attempts to come to grips with the above problem, But, as we
shall see shortly, Schutz's resolution is far from being
satisfactory.
As Schutz sees it, the question of how subjective meanings
can be objectively grasped and scientifically studied can only be
resolved by approaching the question on two levels: that the
social scientist simultaneously participates in two different
forms of life, or i n h i s own term i nol ogy, i n two d i st i nc t 'finite
provinces of meaning'— he is at once a member of both the life-
world and the scientific community, In other words, objectivity
would be guaranteed in so far as intersubjectivity pertaining to
these two spheres are both un p r ob 1 erna t i c Ob j e c t i v i t y i n social
scientific studies therefore presupposes the validity of
intersubjectivity at the mundane level analysed in the previous
section. That is to say, like mundane under standing, scientific
understanding involves the construction of typifications or models
of human action— personal- idea! types and course-of-action types
— but in such a way that these models must at once both remain
10. Giddens, 1982, p. 7.
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consistent with common-sense constructs and -fulfill certain
scientific requ i remen is, Before we examine these requ i r emen ts
let us first direct our attention to Schutz's idea of the
scientific mode 1,
Rober t Gorman has righ11y pointsd out that of the main
elements of Weber's methodology Schutz endorses the three most
important ones, that is, the concept of value-relevance, the
process of MJerstehen', and the use of ideal types to link
ernp i r i c a 1 fact with su b j e c t i v e me an i n g ,!I 1 Gorrn an fails to
mention that Schutz also went beyond Weber in arguing that all
these three elements are not the special prerogative of the social
scientists. All are, instead, ''tech n i q u e sw i t h wh i c h we, as
normal members of the 1ife-world, employ in order to come to terms
with the business of everyday living. Just as verstehen is a
common prat ice of social actors so the use of %typifications' is
an integral part of all knowing processes. Therefore all our
knowledge of the worId invo1ves constructs, which is nothing but a
set of abstractions, generalizations, formalizations and
idealizations. And this means that only those aspects of realitys
which are relevant for our purposes at hand can he knowab1e.
Mevertheless, there is a difference between the natural and
scientific at titudes. The former is essentially guided by
pragmatic interests, rooted as it were in each individual's unique
biographical situation. But to the socia 1 scientist th e soc i a 1
wor id is not of pr a t i c a 1 i n t er e s t bu t rne r el y of c ogn i t s ve
interest. This Schutz characterises as the disinterested
attitude' of the scientific obser v e r. As a. r e su It, the constructs
of human interaction formed by the social scientist differ from
those of the common-sensi cal ones. The scientist has no ''here'
within the social world, his stock of know1 edge at hand is simply
the corpus or tradition of his science, and he has to take it for
11, Gorman, 1977, p.16.
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granted or else he has to Nshow cause' why he cannot do so. To
this corpus of science belong the body of scientific knowledge
which have been verified, as well as the rules of procedure
including the methods of forming constructs in a. scientifically
sound way. But Schutz also held that (s)ocial things are only
understandable if they can be reduced to human activities; and
human activities are only made understandab1e by showing their in-
order-to or because —rn o t i v e s.11 (1964 5 13) Schutz repeatedly
emphasized that every concrete human action is constituted by
specific i n-or der-1o and because-mo t i ves, and we have seen tha. t
only the actor has direct access to these motives. How then does
the social scientist proceed?
From the start the social scientist has a different scheme of
relevance from that of the actor's And Schutz argues that the
scientific attitude itself is not concerned with particular actors
or actions; instead, he is only roncerned with typical ones. His
mode 1 s are var i ousl y descr i bed by h irn as 1 i f e 1 ess f i c t i ons',
Npuppets', or humuncu 1 i' created by the sheer grace of the social
scientist, The social scientist begins to construct typical
course-of-action patterns corresponding to the observed events.
Thereupon he co-ordinates to these typical course-of-action
patterns a personal type, a model of an actor whom he imagines as
being gifted with consciousness, Yet it is a consciousness
restricted to containing nothing but a 11 the e1ements re1evant to
the performance of the course-of-action pattern under observation
and re 1evan t, therewith, to the scientist's problem under
scrutiny. He ascribes, thus, to this fictitious consciousness a
set of typical in-order-to motives corresponding to the goals of
the observed course-of-action patterns and typical because-motives
upon which the in-order-to motives are founded. Both types of
motives are assumed to be invariant in the mind of the imaginary
actor-model. (1962:40)
Unlike concrete social actors, these model of actors do not
have any biography, they do not have their own scheme of
relevance, purposes at hand, projects, phantasies and anxieties.
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in short, he is not bounded by the ontoloqical conditions of
actual, real human beings. In a manner reminiscent to William F,
Why te• s classical critique of Parson, Schutz proclaims that the
cannon o-f scientific model construction requ i res that 11( i) t i s he,
the social scientist, who sets the stage, who distributes the
roles, who giues the cues, who defines when an Nact ion' starts and
when it ends and who determines, thus, the Nspan of projects'
involved, 1962:42)
If this is indeed the necessary, because the only scientific,
way of constructing models, then how do they enable us to
understand and explain actual concrete social action? How can we
be certain that they provide not merely plausible generalizations
and plausible stories, but genius explanation? To attempt to
answer these challenges leads Schutz direc11y to consider the
methodological restrictions on the construction of such models.
In his various papers Schutz deve1 ops no 1ess than six
p os t ul ateswh i c h must be fulfilled if t h e 'con s t r u c t s of t h e
second degree-' are to be sc i en t i f i cal 1 y valid, I n an a 1 ys i ng t h e se
methodological prerequisities it may be useful to be ar in mind
that Schutz has nowhere provided us a complete discussion of them.
His scattered comments on them can be found in number of his
papers,14 Neverthe!ess, it is possib1e to distinguish these
oostu1 ates into two broad categories, corresponding to the two
sides of the sdouble hermeneutic' nature of social inquires.
Adherence to the postulates of logical consistency, compatibi1ity,
re1evancy, and r ationa 1ity wou1d guaran tee the scientific'
character of such models; while the postulates of subsetive
12, In the world of Talcott Parsons, actors are constantly
orienting themselves to situations and very rarely, if ever,
acting. The show is constantly in rehearsal, but the curtain
never goes up. Whyte, in Max Black ed., Ih Snzlnl
of lalooii Eaosxans, 1962, p. 42.
13, Barry Hindess, 1977, p«48.
14, See particularly 1962:43-4; 1964:18-19, 83-84; and in
Grathoff ed, 1978:59-60,
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interpretation and adequacy are meant to bridge or close the gap
between the worlds o-f the social scientists and the social actors.
Let us see what these postulates entail:
1) The postualte o-f logical consistency requires that
t h e sy s t em of t y p i c a 1 constructs design by the
scientist has to be established with the highest degree
of clarity and distinctness o-f the coneeptua 1 -framework
imp] i ed and rnust be fu 1 1 y cornpat i b 1 e wi th forma 1 1 oqi c.
Fulfillment of this postulate warrants the objective
validity of the thought objects constructed by the
social scientist, and their strictly logical character
is one of the most important features by which
scientific thought objects are distinguished from the
thought objects constructed by common-sense thinking in
dai1y life which they haye to supersede. (1962:43)
(2) The postulate of relevance insists that (t)he formation
of ideal t yp e s rnu s t c ornp 1 y with the principle of
relevance, which means that the problem, once chosen by
the social scientist, creates a scheme of reference and
constitutes the limits within which relevant ideal types
might be found. (in Grafhoff ed. 1978:59)
(3) The postulate of c ornp a t i b i 1 i t y holds t h a. t t) h e sy s t em
of ideal types must contain only scientifically
verifiable assumptions, whic h have t o be full y
c omp a tib1e wit h the who 1 e of ou r scie n tific knowledge.
(in 6 r a t h off e d, I 9 7 8:60)
(4) The postulate of rationality states that (t)he ideal
type of social action must be constructed in such a way
that the actor in the living world would perform the
typified act if he had a clear and distinct scientific
knowledge of all the elements relevant to his choice and
the constant tendency to choose the most appropriate
means for the realisation of the most appropriate end
.... (It) implies, furthermore, that all other behavior
Chap ter 111
has to be interpreted as derivat i ve from the basic
scheme of rational acting, The reason for this is that
on1y action within the framework of patjona1 categories
can be scientifically discussed. 1964:87)
5)
fhe postu1 ate of subjective in terpre tation requires that
( i) n order to e x p 1 a i n h urn art ac t i on s t h e sc i e n t i s t has
to ask what model of an individual mind can be
eonstructed and what typ i ca 1 contents must be
attitributed to it in order to exp1 ain the obserued
facts as the result of the ac tivity of such a mind in an
understandable relation, The c omp1ianc e with t his
postulate w a r r a. n t s t h e p o s s i b i 1 it y o f r e f e r r i n q a 1 1
kinds of huamn action or t he i r resu1t to the subjactive
meaning such actio n or resu1t of an ac tion ha d fo r t he
actor, 1962:43)
6 Fina 11y, the postu1 a te of a de q uac y stip u1 at es t hat
e)a ch ter m in a s cien tific mode1 o f huma n ac tion m u s t
be constructed in such a way that a human act performed
within the life-world by an individual actor in the way
indicated by the t ypic a 1 c on str uc t wouId be
understandable for the actor himself as well as for his
f e 1 1 ow -m e n i n t e r m s o f c ornrn o n- s e n s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f
everyday life. Comp1 iance with this postulate warrants
the c ons i s t ency of t he c ons t r uc t s of t he soc i a 1
scientist with the c o n s t r u c t s o f c ornrn o n~ s e n s e e x p e r i e n c e
of the social reality. 1962:44)
In short, the constructions of models according to the
prescriptions of these postulates would render them vadequatex
both at the levels of causality and meaning, at the same time
satisfying the objective cannons of science. Whether this is in




4.1 A CRITIQUE OF SCHUTZ'S SCIENTIFIC METHODOLOGY
In the last chapter we have already noted that Schutz-'5
t r e a true n t o-f i n t e r su b j e c t i v i t y as a p h i 1 osop h i c a 1 p r ob 1 em is f a r
-from being unequivocal and conclusive. In particular, the status
o-f the We-r e 1 at i onsh i p' is highly ambiguous, lending itself to
several possible lines of interpretation. I have suggested that
one way of seeing it is to view it as providing a phi 1osophical
(by no means transcendental) foundation for a general theory
of understanding, Seen this way, criticising Schutz on the
grounds that the N We ~r e 1 a t i on sh i p' or t h e' Umwe It1' is n o t
amenabl e to sc i en t i f i c i nqu i ry s i rnp 1 y w i 1 I not do. For apar t from
differentiating those aspects of the social world that were to be
an a 1yse d phi 1osophic a11y t he c on s titutin g Ego s a 11 ention a 1 Ac t s
and the UmweIt) and those that could be subjected to scientific
study (the Mitwelt and the Worwelt), Schutz at the same time tried
to base the foundation of a scientific sociology on the premises
of his phi!osophseal ana 1ysis. But precisely how far is Schutz
successful in achieving a synthesis of subjectivity and
objectivity is something we must turn to now. One way of doing
this is to evaluate his six postulates.
Of all the six pos tuS a t e s, the pos t u1 a tes of c omp atibi1it y
and logical consistency are the least objectionable, save that
whereas the former expresses an over-ready acceptance of much
xscientifically verified' knowledge, the latter shows an altoge¬
ther too uncritical view of formal logic. For since Godel and
Tarski it is now almost part of philosophical common-sense that no
logistic system can be se1f-va1idating. And as a set of ru1es
devoid of empirical content, formal logic can guarantee neither
truth nor objectivity.
The postulate of relevance is much more problematic. Though
no one i think, would argue nowadays against the
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i n 11 uence of ga 1 ues i n t he se 1 ec t i on of N -f acts-', t h i s pos t u 1 a t
pays no a11en tion to the struc ture of the wor]d and hence Is
unable to recognise that some s e 1 e ctions are be11er than others.
1 htru i tfu 1 ness of a part i cu 1 ar abstrac t i on or i dea 1 i zat i on must
ultimately be based not only on our 'scheme of relevance' but also
t h a t it mu s t s om e h ow c a t c h o r rep r e s e n t r e a. 1 i t y. If t h e p r i nc i p 1 e
of relevance tells us what N re 1 egan t ideal types' must be formed
it does not tell us why this particu1 ar idea 1 type is more
preferable or appropriate than any other. Here Schutz is even
more guIner a b1e than U eh e r who a t 1 east ackn ow1ed g es the
'objec tig e' significance of certain cult ura 1 ga lues in the
quidance of forming ideal types in a partic u1ar historica 1
era, Speaking from a phenomenologs ca1 point of giew, Reritore
argues that this princip1e of re1egance on1y becomes c 1 ar when
the process of knowing is itself made thematic, i.e., only when
the epoche is used to reveal the structures of consciousness
w h e r e i n c ogn i t i on oc c urs, W i t h ou t su c h t ran see n de n t a 1
t h e mi at i z a t i on the r e i s n o s e 1 f- c o n s c i o u s c 1 a r i t y a b o u t w h i c h s o r t s
of empirical propositions are 1 i c i t and which illicit
yit hout truly int er na 1 c rit eria of e viden ce,., empiric a 1
s t a t e m e n t s r e rn a i n at t h e 1 e v e 1 o f u n c o r r e c t ed in d uc t i v e
genera 1 ization«... W)ithout the discip1 in e of t he epoc he
rendering thematic and hence prob1ematic on the transcendenta 1
level his own ingo1gem en t in the L e b en swelf.., he ca n never
c om prehe n d h i s o w n w o r 1 d~ p e r for rn i ng 1 i f e 1 e t a 1 o n e t h a t o f
o t h e r s .1
Sc h u t z is high1y am higuou s on the postulate of ra tion a 1 It y,
and it is not difficult to find opposing interpretations within
the literature on Schutz' work, Indeed, Schutz is here so
equivocal that even Gar f i nke 1 '%m i sunderstands•' h irn when he dr ew
from Schutz's statement the ideal of rationality is not and
cannot be a peculiar feature of everyday thought nor can it
therefore be a methodological principle of the interpretation of
1, M. P. Peri tore j 19 7.3, p• 1 o 6«
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hurnan al. t in ri- i i i v i i s r 4- l i.,,...• l
Ud'! lite the conclusion that i)t is not
neC(?~ar' anc' voidable in theorizing activities employed in
coming to terms with the affairs of everyday life1'0 No doubt
bchutz himself was at pains to point out that the ideal of
rational action, understood as action informed by a comprehensive
knowledge of the conditions, ends, means of action together with
calculable reactions by other actors, is simply impossible
k 1 964..• V-8U; 1 ?'o2 i JU~d 1. He never the 1 ess stre ssed that( i )n a
theoretical system,,. only pure rational types are admitted,
(1 9 6 4; S 7) bchutz e v e n w e n t o n t o r c ornrn e n d s o c i a 1 s c I e n t i s t s t o
build their 'ideal types as if all actors had oriented their 1 ife-
plan and, t h e r e f o r e, all their activities t o the c h i e f ri d o f
real i z i n g the gr e a t e s t u t i 1 it y w i 11; t h e m i n i mum of c os t s; h uman
ac tivity whic h is orien ted in such a way (and on 1y this kind of
human ac tivity) is the subj ec t matter of your science. 1964:87)
c h u t z s i n c o n si s t e n c y 1 i e s in i h e f a c t t hat he a 1 s o con tends that
a distinction ought to be made betwe e n ration a 1 constructs of
models of human actions and constructs of models of rational human
ac t i on s i 982 :44), an d it is n o t a. 1 t oge t h er c 1 e ar wh a t h i s
postulate of rationality amounts up to, If it means the former,
the postulate itself is extravagant for it can be easily subsumed
into the postal at e of 1ogic a 1 c onsistency; if it means the latter,
then I think. Gar f i n k e 1 is r i gh t i n t h a t s i n c e rational i t y' is
not a cardinal feature of everyday life, there is no reason why we
have to stick to it, In addition, Schutz simply assumes that
action tollowin q the u ti1 itaria n and marginal principles i ri
e c o n omic s are objectively rati ona 1. Such a contention can no
longer be entertained in view of the recent debates on this
issue. Schutz's interest in rational human action seems to have
been more influenced by the apparent success attained by the
economists rather than by Weber, whose notion of -zweckrational'
action is at least tied to historical circumstances.
2. Schutz, 1984, p.79; quoted by Garfinkel in Giddens ed., 1974,
p. 87.
3. Garfinkel, in Giddens ed., 1974, p. 69.
4. See B. Wilson ed., 1970s Hoi lis and Lukes eds., 1982.
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The postulate of subjective interpretation is in many ways
the most important one, -for it is this postulate which ultimately
ensures that the constructs o-f -fictitious actsactors receives an
accent of reality by providing a link between scientific and
common-sense constructs. Correctly understood, the postulate of
subjective interpretation... means merely that we always CAN
and for certain purposes MUST— refer to the activities of the
subjects within the social world and their interpretation by the
actors in terms of systems of projects, available means, motives,
relevances, and so on. (1962s35) This, as Peri tore notes,
commits social science to a thoroughgoing methodological
individualism, But there can be no grumble over its subscription
to the principles of methodological individualism, if it is seen
as a point of departure rather than as an end point in the chain
of explanations. Certainly Schutz has every riqht to choose his
own starting point, and he has already shown that otherwise the
social scientist may well be imposing his own categories on the
actors being studied and thus commixing the error of remedying'
or Nreifying' social reality. The trouble is rather that, given
his own frame of reference, adherence to this postulate of
subjective interpretation is possib1e on 1y if the thesis of the
reciprocity of perspectives is unproblematic, because social
science, by his own definition, is concerned not with
understanding concrete individuals, but with understanding
contemporaries and predecessors crouched in terms of typifications
which are intersubjective1y avai1ab1e. This, as we shall shortly
see, merely begs the question rather than solves it.
But perhaps it is the postulate of adequacy that has
generated most con tradictory interpretations. In general, two
5.
6.
For an excellent discussion of the issue on methodological
individualism see the debate collected in O'Neill ed., 1973.
The 1iturature on this postulate is quite substantial, but
see especially P. Filmer et al, 1972; Zijderveld, 1972;
Peri tore, 1975; Giddens, 1976; R. Bernstein, 1976;
Howarth-Wi11 tarns, 1977; R. Carroll, 1982; O'Neill, 1983;
and Outwaite, 1983.
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objections to this postu1 ate can be r aised, The first beinq
concerned w i t h the t e c h n seal d j f -f i c u 1 t i e s and in de e d t h e
possibility of adhering to it, According to Giddens, if this
postulate means that sociological concepts must be translatable
into c ommon se n sic a1 ones that can b e unders tood b v th o s e to wh ose
conduct they refer, S c h u t z does n o t t 1 1 u s h ow t h i s c o u 1 d b e
a c c om pi i shed, be a r i n g i n m i n d t hat h e h i m s e 1 f m a i n t a ins t h a. t t h e
scientist and the ac t or have d i f f er e n t schemes of r e 1 ev a.nc e a t
h a n d. H ow a r t h ~~Ui i 1 1 i arn s has pointed out that given S c h u t z s t h e o r y
of meaningj the time element is crucial in this postulate, For if
c om p r e h e n s i b i 1 i t y h y t h e a c t o r rn u s t b e a b s o 1 u t e 1 y i mme d i a t e the n
s o c i o I o q y w o u 1 d si rn p 1 y b e equ i v a 1 e n t w i t h t r a n s c r i p t ion. A n d i -f a
time lag is allowed, then as a criterion of va1idity this
postulate is even more prob1em a tic, and S chu 12 him se1f
acknow 1 edged that• th i ngs 1 ook d i f f eren t the rnor n i ng af ter, On
top of this there is also the problem of subjective
interpretation, Even if the socio1ogist uses exact!y the same
terms as the actors this in no way ensures that both mean the same
thing, even i n t he even t cf the so cio1o gist s howin g his written
up pi e c e to th e rn em b e r s a n d s a y i n q s I s t h i s w h a t y o u m e a n t?•'
there are still the questions of (a) the members' interpretation
of the sociologist s ac c oun t, and( b) t he soc i o 1 og i s t s
interpretation of the members' reaction to the account. Ihe
resu11 is a process o f i r f sn i 1 e regre ssion whic h c an on 1 y be
escaped by falling back on the assumption of the reciprocity of
perspectives.
But what is rea 11y at stake is not on 1y the technical
difficulties of carrying o ut thi s postu1 ate, it is a1s o a matter
concerning the status of sociological interpretation as such.
Thus Giddens argues that compliance to this postulate would result
in a restriction of the formation of scientific concepts, thereby
hindering the development of a critical social science.
Recently, J. O'Neill has argued that this interpre tation of
Schutz ultimately rests upon a scientistic prejudice against
7. Howar th-Wi11iams, 1977, p.195,
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cornrno n- s ense kn0wledge. Or 0Ne ill's symp torna t i c read i ng, the
pustu 1 ce ol adequacy calls f or noth i ng 1 ess than th•?
insututiona1ization of the translatabi1ity and the r e by-
accountability of expert knowledge in order to raise the 1 e«e 1 of
the we] 1- i n-formed citizen.... (It) implies the need to crea te a
pe dagoqy that w i 1 1 subor d i nate exper t know 1 edge to the needs o-f
po1 ifica 1 democracy, I am not at all sure whether this
reading o-f Schutz would go unchallenged by other interpreters,
A iter- all, Schutz hi m s e 1 -f did r e g a r d hi s ow n w o r k a s a
contribution towards the establishment of an 'object i v e soc i .a 1
science. In an y case, this wouId not c on s tit u t e an en tire1y
justified criticism of Giddens, wh0 did main tain that every
c ompet e nt socia1 ac tor is himse1f a socia1 scien tist en gaged in
the or d i n ar y c: our se of his affairs. Wh a t 0 'Ne i 1 1 appare n 11 y f a 1 I s
o recognize, and what in 6iddens' s mind bridge the ga,p b01we e n
h e rmene utic and critical sociology is his dis tin c tion between
mutual know1edge and comm on-sens e knowledge, which S c hutz
conf 1 ate s u n de r on e c a t e gor y:% s t ock of k n ow ledge-'. G i dde n s
argues that rnutua1 know ledge, understood a s t a c i t k n ow 1 e d g e
embroiled in practical consciousness, is not corrig?b1e in the
1 iqh t of socia 1 and natura 1 scientific findings. Indeed, the
social scientist must himse1f share and presuppose the va1idity
o f t h e s e rn u t u a 1 k n o w ledge before he c a n p a r t i c i p a t e in a n d
there-fore understand the actors-' form o-f life. Not so wi th
common-sense knowledge. Thus the incorrigibility of mutual
k n ow ledge is no bar- r i e r to c r i t i c a 1 inquiry into our e v e r y day
practices and beliefs, not excluding their possible ideological
r am i f i c a t i on s. To c on f 1 a t e mutual k n ow ledge with c omm on --sen se an d
hold on t o t he 1 r'' au t hen t i c i t y', as 0'Me ill exp 1 i c i 11 y ar:d Sc.hu t z
implicitly did, would merely relapse into one form of romantic
rel ativ1sm or another,
No doubt we have to beware of the potential undesirable
political consequences which may follow from social theories such
as some versions of functionalism, structuralism, and Marxism
8. O'Neill, in Sabia and Wallulis eds„, 1983, p.66.
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w h i c h n e g 1 e c t actors' 'definitions o f t h e s i t u a t i o n'. B u t w e a1 s o
inow? since Marx, Freud, Ni etzche and Pareto— P, Ri coeur has
referred to the former three as the 'masters of suspicion'.-- the
vqry privi1 edge of the agent's position may be questioned, so that
h i s off to 1 qq seal pr i v i] edge does not au toma t i ca 1 1 y guar an tee
e pist emologsea] aut horit y, Indeed, if socio!ogic a1 e x p1 an a tion is
t o b e w o r t h its salt then it m u s t be accepted t hat t h e a g e n t' s
specia1 authority is never absolute, since what is to be exp1 ained
consists in and depends upon episodes in his life, considered as a
biographica 1 who1e situated in a social-historical con t ext,
C o n s i d e r t h e e x am p 1 e g i v e n b y B e r n s t e i n, t h a t a p e r s o n w h o
performs the action of washing his hands, A number of
interpretations are possible. We can accept as a statement of his
motive at its face value that he did it in order to clean his
hands, o r we can be skeptical t o such %in-or d er-1 o' motives and
regard it as a neurotic symptorn. Neither Schutz's postu1 ate of
subjective interpretation nor adequacy are helpful for us to
unravel the complex mechanisms of self-deception or dramaturgical
s tr at egies, A n d it is at this point that we can a 1so q ue siion the
c a t e gor i c a 1 distinct! on made by Schutz be twe en the in -or de r -1 o an cl
because motives. In many cases these are not two kinds of
e x p 1 an a tions, f or t h e identification of the former is oft en on 1y a
necessa: stage In giving an adequate causa1 exp1 anation cf the
piece o f ac t i on in quests on. We rnu s f therefore treat t h e s e two
i i nds cf mo t i ves as mu tua 1 1 y i n terdependent as we 1 las i n terna 11 y
r e 1 a t e d.
In short, what Schutz's twin postulates of subjective
interpretation and adequacy amounts to is the social scientist
beinq 'eft wi th the original Nground!ng' of the mode 1 in the
everyday world as a means of se1f-validation through his own
common-sense theorising and procedures. As an alternative to
the 'pes i t i v i s t' s' 1 og i c of val i dat i on th is is hard! y conv i nc i ng.
In an extreme form Schutz's postulates can be seen as allowing for
certain kinds of 'arm-chair theorising', where all the social
9. R. Carroll, 1982, p.393.
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scientist needs to do is to sit back on his arm-chair and
c o n o v. r u c t mode 1 s according t o w h a t e v 0 r e x per i ence h 0 rn a y h aue o f
the lite -worid and simultaneously c1 aimin q scientific v a 1 i d i ty if
he himself is a normal Iy socialized member of society (and who is
to say that he is not?). Of course Schutz would reply that the
const!' u c t i o n of such models rn us t also foil o w other me thodol oq i cal
restrictions. But even if the fuIfi1lment of all such
r e q uirement s is possible, they do not he1p us to determin e whe t her
the 1nterpretation being offered is a correct one, and to choose
be tween c ompeting e xp1 an a tjons,
One way out of this i mpasse i s to rad i cal i se Schu tz•' s
postulate of adequacy along the 1ines suggested by R, Carroll.
Because Schutz sees the realms of science and common-sense as
be 1 ong i ng to two d i f f er en t finite prou i nce of rnean i ng, the
soc i a 1 scientist c an on 1 y f ee 1 t ha t h i s rnode 1 s wou 1 d be
unde rst an dab1e to the actor, e v en if t he scientist is himse1f a
member of t h e same socie ty of the act or's Thu s Schu t z' s
methodological i rid i v i du a 1 i sm mu s t e j t h e r r e 1 ap se i n t o wh a t
Merton calls individual methodo1ogical so1ipsism or group
me thodol og i cal sol i ps i sm. The f orrner i mp 1 i es that on 1 y the
individual has ab solute privi1e ge of know1ed g e abou t himself; and
the latter holds that one has monopo1 istic or privi 1 eged access to
know I edge by virtue of one'' s gr-oup member sh i p, Sc hu tz clear! y
recognises the dangers of the former and sought to ground his
met hodology in the 1 a11 er. Butev e n t he 1 a iter is untenab1e
because authentic awareness, is not guaranteed by social
affi1iation.».. De terminan ts of social 1 ife... are not
necessarily evident to those directly engaged in it. In short,
sociological understanding involves much more than acquaintance
with. It involves an emp i r i c a 1 1 y c on f i rrnab 1 e c omp r 0 h e n s i on of t h e
conditions and often comp1ex processes in which peop 1 e are caught
up without much awareness of what is going on. To analyse and
understand these requires a theoretical and technical competence
10. Mer t on, in Bo 11 ornor e e d., 1972,
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transcends one's status as Insider or Outsider,1 Uie
have aire ady seen t h at it is precise1y this a11itu de of
sc i en t i st i c narc i ss i srn that O 'Ne i 1 1 has so ernphat i cai 1 y objec ted
t o. du t ituw do we c omp r cm i se critic a 1 sc i e n t i f i c u n der s t and i n q
with hermeneuticai interpretation? Giddens attempts to resolve
t C i s uy d i v;-1. i {igu i sh s n 9 be twee n mutual know 1 edqe an d c omrnon-
sens i ca I k now 1 e dgc?, bu t he remains almost silent on the 1 e ve 1 of
v erification. C ar ro1 s u g g e s t s t hat a parti a 1 s o1ution t o this
problem is by returning to the actor himself, and argues that the
postu1 ate of adequacy does imp1y this radica 1 departure, that of
va 1 idating the socia I scien ti fic model OF the everyday worid IN
the everyday wor Id, BY t he ac tors t hemse1ve s, Thus
c) ompa t i b i f i t y of t he ac t or' s ac c oun t w i t h t h a t of t he soc i a 1
scientist appear to v alidate the mod e1, and inc ompatibi1 it y
appea rs to i nva i ioate t he mo de1. Nevert heless, C arroil c onc e des
that the social scientist can still never be absolutely sure of
his model, it is just not possible that the model can ever be
tota 11y va 1 idated as in the natural sciences, Carro11 conc1udes
by citing Urn F. Whyte's £q£.d.£:jc as the prototype of
bringing back the study to the actors themse1ves. Basica 11y I
have no qualms about such a strategy of social scientific
verification, a n d w ou1d endorse entirely B aurn an's insight t hat
t) h e e m a n c i p a t o r y p o t e n t i a 1 o f k nowl edge is p u t to the test
and, indeed, may be actualised~~ only with the beginning of
dialogue, when the %objects' of theoretical statements turn into
active part n ers in the incipient process of authentic a tion,°
Ac c or ding t o B a urn an, t h e n, wh at distinguishes critical kn ow 1 edge
from other forms of knowledge is not so much the particu 1 ar va 1ues
choosen, or even a pecuI i ar criticai sceptic!sm, but rather the
way in which an interpretation is vverified' and %authenticated',
I n other words, the hall rnark of critical knowl edge cons i s t s i n t he
11. Her ton, in Bo11 omor e ed., 1972, p.41, See a1 so Ge11ner's
much celebrated article in B. Wilson ed», 1970,
12. Carrol 1, 1982, p.394.
13. Baurnan, 1976, p. 106.
Chapter IK-
attempt of the social scientist to engage in a dialogue with the
ac tor-'b, thereby tr ansp 1 an t i ng rou tine 1 i f e and i ts common sens i cal
reflection f r om the 'outside-' i n t o t h e N i n s i de' o t c ommu n i c a t i on
and passing f rom professional discourse into an open dialogue.
My on 1y reservation is that Carroil is here over-stretchinq
Schutz's postulate of adequacy, so that his suggestions sounds
de+inite1y more Habermasian and Gadamer an than Schu tzian, for i n
Schutzs terminology, the social scientist is at best an 'indirect
and disinterested social observer'. Indeed, it is precisely
because the scientist has no me ans of che eking his i nterpreta tion
via participation in the v U) e~ r e 1 at i o n s h i p'' t h a t t h e y h a v e t o
construet their mode 1s according to the restrictions prescribed by
Schu tz.
So Sc h u t z s methodological wr i t i n gs ar e be se t w i t h c on c e p t u a 1
ambiguities, logical inconsistencies and technica 1 difficu1ties.
At the root of his failure in offerino us a viab1e a 1ternat i ve to
p os i t i v i s t i c met hodo 1 ogy we mu s t, h owe v e r, be a r i n rn i n d that it
is not his intention to rep1 ace positivism in toto) is that he is
not entirely free from certain objectiv1st remnants, as evidenced
i n h is notions of the 'scientific c ommu n i t y', t h e' d i s i n t e r e s t e d
observer', and his rather positivistic conception of causality
etc. Yet at the same time he is still caught in certain traps of
subjectivism. The end result is not so much a synthesis as an
artificial union of sub j ec t i v i t y and ob j e c t i v i t y. J
Schutz's contrI bution lies in his first seeing t he 'dou b 1 e
h9rmeneu tic a1' nature of all social inquiries. this insight
commands that the concepts of the social scientist must be
intensubjective1y valid in the two realms of the 1ife-worId and
the scientific c ommunit y, i. e,, the c onc ept s of the social
scientist must c on f orm t o two sets of intersubjec tivoly
constituted meanings. But because he is still much too tied to a
positivistic conception of science and scientific community
14. ibid.
15. Gorman, 1977, p.3.
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isolated a n d s e p e r a t e d f r orri e v e r y d a y] j f e, h e h a s n o t b e n e -f i t e d
•full y f r orn h i s own insights. His insights i n to t he doub 1 e
hermeneutical character of social inquiry is therefore limited to
the contexts of discovery and explanation (because the scientist
shares with the actors the same paramount, real i ty of daily life),
and are not extended to what Bauman calls the 'verification-
authenticati on ax i s, Con se q u e n 11 y, the mode 1 of t h e soc j a 1
scient is t, if const ructed in adherence to c e rt ain me t hodologic a 1
restr i c t i ons, wou 1 d' au tomat i ca. 1 1 ybe regarded as mean i ngf u 1 1 y
adequate at the lev.'el of motivation. And if it further allows us
to make successfu1 predictions, then it wi11 a 1so be scausal 1y
adequate' (a case can be made that Schutz conflates two kinds of
causality in the study of human actions, namely, 'agent causality'
a n d e v e n t c a u s a 1 i t y', u n d e r o n e categ o r y--'• repeatab i 1 i ty'), 11
is a 1 so because of this fhat in the fina 1 ana 1ysis his twin
postulates of subjective interpretation and adequacy remains a
twisted version of the corresponding theory of truth. The crucia1
question— who, the scientist or the actors, is the final court
of trut h-- i n other words who has t he riqh t to accept o r reject
the proposed interpretation— is not even considered by Schutz,
4.2 1NTERSUBJECT!MITY AND SOCIAL ORDER
The problems of order and meaning have long been regarded as
the centra 1 prob 1 em areas i n social theory. However- as
tradItional1y penceived these two prob1 ems were rare1y treated
together, the former pertaining to the theoretical understanding
of social reality; with the latter concerning questions at the
methodological level. While Schutz himself did not directly
address to the prob1 em of xorder', his theory of meaningful action
necessarily has important repercussions on it. Schutz's
sfo11 owers' were sensitive enough to pick out and elabcrate
whatever there is in Schutz which is relevant to this problem.
Thus P. Berger and his colleagues have tried to incorporate
Schutz's insights into the nature of social order into other more
''dominant' theoretical traditions. On the other hand the
ethnomethodologists have opened up a whole new line of research
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no t; n x o the c ausa 1 origin of order as such hu t i n t.o the pr ocesses
o f h ow order is acc orn p 1 i s he d in e v e r y d a y 1 i f e„ In Z i mm e r m a n and
W i eder' s words, t )he e thnorne thodo 1 og i st i s not concerned w i th
providing causal explanations of obs0rvab 1 y r9qu]ar, pa110rned,
repetitive actions by some k i nd of ana 1 ys i 5 of the ac t or• s po i n t
of v i ew. He is concerned wi th how mernbers of soc i ety go about the
t ask of see i n g, describing, an d e x p 1 a i n i n 9 or de r i n t h e wor Id in
which they 1ive. But even if the 'how questions can be
analytica'ly separated f rom the why' ones, there i s no reason why
we must be concernsd with e i thr 0ne or the other» The nature of
social order is inextricably bound up with the process of its
produc tion a n d repreduction; a nd any a deq uat e 5ocia 1 t he0ry mu st
grasp these dua 1 aspects of the same proc:ess«
In a 5emin a 1 article on Socia 1 In t e gr a tion and Syst em
I n tegrat i on, D. Lockwood has r i gh 11 y po i n ted 0u t that both
functional ists and their critic5 a1 ike typica11y mix up two
1 e ve 1 s of ana 1 ys i s under the r ubr i c. of th? pr0b 1 em 0f or der.
For analytical purposes he argues that a distinction must be made
h etween the pro b1em of social integ r a tion, whic h foe us at tention
upon the order1y or conf1ic tfu 1 re 1 a11 onships between the
ac tor s, and the problem! of system n t egrat i on, wh i ch f ocus on
the order 1y or conflictfu1 re 1 ationship be iween the parts of a
social sys t em. Loc kwood t h e n de f i n e s n orrna t i v e f u n c t i on a 1 s sm
as mainly that t he or e t i c a 1 or i en t a t i on wh i c h a t i ernp t s to e x p i a i n
social order at the level of social integration as deriving from
normative consensus. He conc 1 udes that whatever inadequacies
normative functionalism may have in their account of
or de rc on f1ic t at the level of social in tegra tion, ge nera!
functionalism~~ the perspective which directs our attention to
systemic interdependencecontradiction remains as an intellectual
tool indispensable.
16. Zimmerman and Wieder, in J. D. Douglas ed., 1971, p,289.
17. D. Lockwood, in Zo11schan and Hirsch eds., 1984.
18. Lockwood, 1984, p.245.
19. ibid.
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Clearly Schutz has very little to offer in the analysis of
society at the systemic level. His contribution lies mainly in
his illumination of the nature of ssocial integration'.
There is little doubt that Schutz's conception of society
appears to be as orderly as Parsons's. A primary characteristic
of our experience of, and our attitude toward, the life-world is
the fact that this world is taken-for-granted. The Nnatural
attitude of our situated egos not only takes every moment of our
lifes exactly as they present thenselves to us in our everyday
experience, but at the same time silently accepts social knowledge
handed down to us by our elders as a matter of course. Such
recipe knowledge are socially approved, they define the modes of
procedures and conduct regarded as correct, good and natural by
the society in question. At one point Schut z himse1f ev en wen t as
far as suggesting that his concept of typification is equivalent
to the functionalists' notion of social roles In the objective
sense a social group is a structural-functional system formed by a
web of interconnected interaction processes, social roles,
positions, and status. Not the concrete individual or the
concrete person, but the role, is the conceptual unit of the
social system. Each role carries along a particular set of role
expectat i on s wh i c h any i n c urnbe n i of the role is ex p e c t e d t o
fulfill.... In our terminology these role expectations are
nothing but typifications of interaction patterns which are
socially approved... and are frequently institutionalised.
1964:269)
It is ironic, indeed, iragic, that what most text-books have
described (or mis-described) as the leading opponents of
functionalism-- Schutz and Dahrendorf— both abandoned the study
of concrete individuals in the name of science', and both results
in a more or less vconsensual' picture of society, With
Dahrendorf this is inexcusable, for despite all his mumble jumble
on social conflict, he himself contributes a major paper in the
development of role theory in sociology. But as Bidders says,
20. Dahrendorf, 1968.
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(r)o1e is a normative concept; hence to claim that socia1 systems
consists of roles can readily be used to affirm the primacy of the
normative in social theory.2 It can be argued that Schutz
s i m p 1 y misunderstands hi rn self w h e n h e s a y s t h a t t y p i f i c a t i o n s a r e
social roles; and it is important to correct this
misunderstanding. Pyp i f i cat i on need not be a norma five concept,
it requires is that as i ntersubjective knowledge it can be
derived solely from the fact that the actors sustains the
ideal i z a t i ons and has no other ex t er n a 1•' qu ar an t e e t han this
maintenance.22 While social order is intersubjectively
constituted, it is through and through an affair which remains
within the actors' way of seeing. Social order is possible not
because of any automat i c mechan i srn of s i n trojec t i on' w i th i n a
social system but because the actors assume from the outset that
they share a common world—• until there is counter evidence which
provokes reflection. Typifications are accepted and followed not
because actors have internalised them but because they are 'used
to following them and because the acceptance of them serve
pragmatic purposes. Thus any existing order is inherently
precarious j its maintenance is absolute]y continqent. Order is in
the eyes of the beholder, not because it does not exist outside
our head, but the nature of order itself depends on how we
perceive it.
Social order can therefore be seen as the result of a
reifying form of thinking process which is firmly rooted in our
natural attitude. In Schutz's words, the objects of experience
... are always taken for granted. We pay no a11ention to the fact
that they are products of previous conscious activity, that they
have gone through a complex process of constitution, though he
immediately adds that (w)e can... pay such attention if we
choose. 1972:77)
In a recent attempt to spell out Schutz's implicit theory of
re ificat ion, Thomason argues that Schutz's constructionist
21. Giddens, 1979, p.117.
22. J. Heritage, 1984, p.56.
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approach,,. necessarily leads h i m to identity experienced
objectivities as constituted and hence as dependent upon various
subjective processes«. This means that people reify whenever
they ignore such constitution and take the objectivity of their
experience for granted.23 But it is always possible that we can
think and act otherwi se. Though the natura 1 a11 i tude predorni nates
in the paramount reality of everyday 1ife, every individual
participates in 'multiple realities' There is, in other words,
many ways of thinking and seeing and levels of consciousness
corresponding to different 'finite provinces of meaning'. We
experience a 'shock' whenever we 'leap' from one meaning context
to the next. But, again Schutz is not a1 ways clear on this point.
At times he seems to suggest that the natural attitude is the only
one that predominates in the paramount reality of the life-world.
At other times there are hints suggesting there is a particular
kind of natural attitude within each finite province of meaninq
This equivocalness is extremely important when we direct our
attention to the world of science. Is the 'scientific attitude' a
genuinely ''rationa 1' one wh i ch i s qua 1 i tat i ve 1 y d i f f eren t f rom all
others? Or is it one only 'rational' according to its own
c r i t e r Pa and practice? Gar finKe1 wou1d probab1y say that Schu tz
means the latter, but one can find no conclusive answer in Schutz.
For Husserl the answer is clear. He distinguished two modes of
being a theme so common among Western thinkers), i.e., one
characterised by a natural attitude and the other by a
philosophical attitude. It is because Husserl regards the
'scientific attitude' as being xnaive', as not recognizing the
Melos' of their own practices, that he classifies it as one
within the natural attitude. The development of Husserl's
philosophy therefore culminates in a critique of Western science
and society. Had Schutz followed Husserl more thoroughly, his
attitude toward our life-world would have been entirely different,
and it would at least have rendered it more historical. But this
is not the path Schutz chose, instead, he returned to the
problematic he started off: the analysis of the structure (or more
precisely, the meaning-structures) of the life-world. The result
23. B. Thomason, 1982, p.90,
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'~ a social the or y e v e n more devoid of historical content t h a n
Parsons's.
fhis point is externa 1y important in Schutz's description of
the 1 i-fe-world. Unl ike Husser'l he does not condemn or scorn at
our natural attitude-» And T h om a s o n e v e n characterises S c h u t z' s
attitude as one having an open respect -for humanity. Indeed,
he almost praises it by suggesting that cornrnunication between
actors is possible only fay means of typifications, i.e., the world
can only he qr asp e cl as me an i n gf u 1 by u s i f we adop i a' r e i f i e d•'
a 11itude whic h n aive1y assumes t h e existence of sobj ectiv e
categories. It is only by means of typifications that a kind- of
standar di sed 'sameness' can be established thereby facilitating
both individua 1 organization of know1edqe as we 11 as socia 1
interact! on. Sc. h u t z h i rnse 1 f asse r t s t fa a t our on 1 y h op e and
guidance is the belief that we will come to terms ws th this wor1d
for a 11 g o o d a n d p r a c t i c a 1 p u r p o s e s i f w e behave as o 11! e r s be ha v e,
if we take for granted what others believe beyond question.
19642157).
A• gener a 1 i sedtheory of order can theref or e be ex trac t ed
and elaborated from Schutz's work's. In this regard Schutz's
insights into t he nature of socia 1 in teqr ation is indispe n sab1e in
any attempt to come to grips with social reality. But while we
may agree with Thomasons conc1usion that re i f i cation is
e ssen t i a 1 to ui ab 1 e soc i a 1 life, as a c omp 1 e t e ac c ou n t this is
hardly enough. As Bernstein points out, there is a failure to
distinguish c1ear1y those structures which are presumab1y fixed,
permanent, and a priori from those which have specific historical
roots and causes.... W)e want to understand not only the
permanent a priori structures... but also those changing features
and structures that characterise different societies and periods.
And we want to understand how such structures come into being,
flourish, and decline.... Schutz... failed to develop those
24. Thomason, 1982, p.112.
25. Thomason, 1982, p.169.
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coneep ts, categories, and procedures wh i ch wou 1 c! c 1 ar i fy the
difference in the levels and types of structures exhibited in
social reality,26 Schutz's picture of the maintenance and
rep r oduc t i on of the life~wor 1 d c an be cornpar ed w i t h A1 t husser' s
notion of general ideology (as disticnt from particular ideologies
which characterise specific social formations) as a functionally
necessary feature of the existence of every type of society,
wh i ch is eternal, just like the unconciousness,~° But if ever y
ex i st i ng soc i a 1 order encornpasses both genera 1 and par t i cu 1 ar
ideologies, we must tease out the historica 1 variabIes fr om the
historica 1 and trans-historica 1 constants, so that some aspec ts of
everyday life can be altered and humanised, in spite of the
rec a 1 c i t r ance of sorne of i ts structur es. By neg 1 ec t i ng the
historical dimension, Schutz, no less than the functionalists,
commits the error of treating those what he regards of as
i n e 1 u c t ab 1 e' -f e a t u res of social life as desirable, t h ere by
lendsng suppor t to t h e st a t us q u o in ad v ent en11 y, S ocio1ogy
does not become va 1 ue~free when the socio 1 oq i sts regard
thernseIves as -1 sc i ent i sts'. Soc i o 1 ogy i s not, and cannot be, a
purely empirical or moral discipline. The very inception of
sociology as an independent discipline presupposes that a
synthesis between science and morality is possible; but to the
extent that such a synthesis has not been actua 1 ised, socio1ogy
remains in a s t at e of crisis. 11 wou1d be care1e ss t o suppose that
Schutz was unaware of this tension. His choice between science and
phi1osophy is c 1 e ar. Ear 1y in his in te11ect ua1 car e e r he
recognises that genuine understanding can never be grasped
sscientifical1y', that scientific understanding necessarily
imp1ies some distance be tween the sc i en t i st and the ac tor which
ineluctably destroys the primordial relationship. This is the
26. Bernstein, 1976, p. 159-160.
27. Giddens, 1979, p.179.
28. Althusser, 1977, quoted by Giddens, 1979, p.179.
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pr ice he though t it is wor th paying -for, Bu t sc i en t i f i c
in t eqpit y can only be attained at t he e xp en ce of t he or etic a 1
c oh ererice; for once the t i me e 1 erne n t i s a dm i 11 e d t o sc i e n t i f i c
discourse, then the search for 'true understand i nq can never be
complete. Hermeneutical1y speaking, understanding is not a
Herculean task, but a Sisyphusian one which is doomed to remain
fragmentary and incomplete from the start. But the fact that
u n d erstanding is always pa r t i a 1 should not t rou b1e us; so I onq as
we do n o t rnak e an y pretentious c 1 a i rn t o sc i e n t i f i c i t y; so 1 on g as
we are a 1ways prepared to foresake our prof essiona 1 status i n the
attempt to 'come to terms• wi th the actors; and so 1 ong as we
recognise that abso1ute kno wledge is a myih, and that even the
critique of ideology can never be final— these, 1 would argue,
i s w h a t a q e n u i n e open respect f o r h u m a n i t yf w o u 1 d, as a mi n i m u m,
entail. In this sense, and in this sense only, the calling of a
h um anistic and critic a 1 sociology c ontain s t he g er ms of it s own
negation.
29 Yet this is a price not everyone is willing to pay for.
Gadamer, for one, insists that hermeneutics provides the
riposte to the historical d i stanc i at i on of the hurnan
sciences. 6adamer, quoted by Ricoeur, 1981, p.65.);
Habermas, for another, accepts this in a highly qualified
fashion, and only so reluctantly. It seems that I. Oliver in
his call for a r e t urn to the s o1de r he rme neutic s 01 ive r,
1983.) simply misses the gist of Gadamer's argurnent.
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4.3 CONCLUSION
lo conclude5 we can say that Schutz has not solved the
problems of intersubjectivity and meaning in a satisfactory
manner. One can virtually say that he is hoist with his own
p e t ar d, i or his theor y of mean i n g is inherent! y su b j e r. t i v e,
thereby rendering intersubjectivity itself problematic, only to
fal! back on it in an attempt to make understanding objective''
arid 'scientific. It can be argued that Schutz suffers from
operating in t e rrns of a pre -Kuh n i an c on c e p t i on of sc i e nc e, t h ou gh
in his stress on the intersubjective character of science he
c1ear1y anticipates Kuhn and other more recent phi 1osophers of
s c i e n c e.
His confributions to a socio1ogy of know1edge, in particu1 ar
a socio!oqy of science, are therefore considerab1e. 1t is a1 so
poss i b 1 e to ex trac t f rorn Schutz a theory of soc i a 1 order wh i ch i s
not bounded by the limits of a more normative approach. But for
m o s i p r a c t i c i n g sociologists, p e r h a p s S c h u t zs m o s t i r n p o r t a n t
contribution lies in his extreme 1y rich reservior of concepts
bi ograph i ca 1 1 y de term i ned si tuat i ons, schernes of re i ec ances,
1 i f eaction projects, s t oc k of! n ow ledge, t yp i f i c a t i on s, re c i p e
knowledge, multiple realities, etc.— which wi11 definite1y form
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